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THE MYTH AND THE REALITY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Stephen Gardbaum*
This Article critically evaluates the widely held view inside and outside the
United States that American constitutional rights jurisprudence is excep-
tional. There are two dimensions to this perceived American
exceptionalism: the content and the structure of constitutional rights. On
content, the claim focuses mainly on the age, brevity, and terseness of the
text and on the unusually high value attributed to free speech. On struc-
ture, the claim is primarily threefold. First, the United States has a more
categorical conception of constitutional rights than other countries. Sec-
ond, the United States has an exceptionally sharp public/private division
in the scope of constitutional rights resulting in their lesser reach into pri-
vate conduct. Third, the U.S. Constitution is exclusively a charter of
negative rights and so rejects the types of positive constitutional rights, in-
cluding social and economic rights, that many other modern constitutions
recognize.
The thesis of the Article is that while the conventional wisdom is largely
correct about American exceptionalism regarding the contemporary con-
tent of a few specific rights, it is largely wrong regarding the general
structure of constitutional rights. Once labels and assumptions are set
aside, I show that on each of the three identified structural issues, far from
occupying a relatively extreme and lone position as is generally thought,
the U.S. approach is actually well within the contemporary global consti-
tutional mainstream. Debunking the myth of American structural
exceptionalism matters for several important and timely reasons. These in-
clude undermining one prominent argument against the federal courts
using foreign constitutional decisions and also the idea that there are dis-
tinctive threshold barriers in the United States against judicial implication
of afew social and economic rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The familiar notion of American exceptionalism-that, in many spheres
of activity, the United States does things in a qualitatively different way than
other developed countries-is shared by Americans ("only in America") and
non-Americans alike.2 Although there is, perhaps, broad consensus on the
list of differences, there is less agreement between internal and external
viewpoints on their explanations, and still less on the underlying normative
assessment attached to the entire phenomenon. While Americans tend to see
these differences as a badge of honor, reflecting the vigor and boldness of
the new world versus the old, many non-Americans like to view them, if not
quite as a badge of shame, as a badge of immaturity, cultural inferiority, or
lack of sophistication.
Depending on one's perspective, the standard list of differences includes
economic systems (free market capitalism versus a mixed economy),
political traditions (U.S. antigovernmentalism, top elective offices open to
1. The idea of American exceptionalism is commonly traced to John Winthrop's "citty upon
a hill" sermon of 1630, and from there to Thomas Paine's Common Sense. The term itself is usually
attributed to Tocqueville: "Thus the Americans are in an exceptional situation, and it is unlikely that
any other democratic people will be similarly placed." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 455-56 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
2. The historical and sociological literature on American exceptionalism, in its various
guises, is vast. Among the best-known general works are JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA: EXCEPTIONALISM AND IDENTITY FROM 1492 TO 1800 (1993);
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996);
DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998); Michael Kammen, The Problem of
American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 1 (1993); Dorothy Ross, American Excep-




those with little or no political experience, and the absence of both a strong
socialist movement3 and a professional, high-level civil service), work ethics
and culture, moral and personal values, the contemporary roles of religion
and extent of religious belief, attachment to firearms, unique team sports,
senses of humor, and forms of self-presentation. The explanations of these
differences are, of course, legion and much disputed, but they include the
United States' newness, existence and status as the product of the first
successful colonial revolution, geography, political isolation and
isolationism, a long period of buoyant economic self-sufficiency, and
demographics as a heterogeneous and non-organic immigrant society.4 To a
greater or lesser degree, the United States seems to have evolved differently,
like a giant Galapagos, or better yet, started out as a political-economic
mutation of the species.
There is a parallel view, widespread among both American and com-
parative legal scholars, that the list of differences also includes
constitutional law.5 Prior to 1945, the United States was unequivocally ex-
ceptional in this regard and, by any standard, far more exceptional than it is
now. It was then one of the very few countries with a written constitution
that (1) included a bill of rights, (2) gave the constitution, including the bill
of rights, the status of the supreme law of the land, (3) entrenched it against
amendment or repeal by ordinary legislative vote, and (4) enforced it by the
power of judicial review. Since 1945, however, the developed world in par-
ticular has converged on these constitutional fundamentals to such an extent
that countries which continue to reject one or all of them-such as the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand, or Australia 6-are now
truly exceptional.
3. The classic work is WERNER SOMBART, WHY IS THERE NO SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED
STATES? (Patricia M. Hocking & C.T. Husbands trans., Macmillan 1976) (1906). See also SEYMOUR
MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE: WHY SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE
UNITED STATES (2000).
4. See sources cited supra note 2 for these and other explanations.
5. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and
the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1335 (2006) (arguing that
the Constitution is the focal point of the American creed of exceptionalism); Lorraine E. Weinrib,
The postwar paradigm and American exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAS 84 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). See also the work on particular areas of constitutional excep-
tionalism cited throughout the Article. Bruce Ackerman has been characterized by one reviewer as
the "most prominent representative" of a contemporary academic movement to "attribute the vitality
of the American constitutional order to 'American exceptionalism.'" James E. Fleming, We the
Exceptional American People, II CONST. COMMENT. 355, 355 (1994).
6. The United Kingdom still lacks a written-or, more accurately, a codified-constitution,
the conception of constitutional law as a source of law hierarchically superior to statute, and the
judicial power to disapply a domestic statute (outside the context of EU law). E.g., Stephen Gard-
baum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001). The
constitution of the Netherlands expressly denies the courts the power of judicial review. GRONDWET
[Gw.] [Constitution] art. 120 (Neth.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE
NETHERLANDS (2002) ("The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be re-
viewed by the courts."). New Zealand, like the United Kingdom, has no written constitution and
denies its courts the power of judicial review. Gardbaum, supra. Australia has a written constitution
that does not contain a bill of rights.
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Nonetheless, even within the common framework of these modem con-
stitutional fundamentals, there is still a pervasive sense that the United
States remains broadly exceptional or different, even if not as exceptional as
before 1945. That is to say, such differences are in some meaningful sense
general, systemic, or qualitative in nature and not merely limited to the type
of particular, specific, or narrow differences that inevitably exist between the
constitutional laws of any two or more countries. There are, if you will, one
or more macro-differences that are more than the sum of ordinary, expected
micro-differences among constitutional systems. In a word, American con-
stitutional law is still perceived as different from all other constitutional
laws. And yet, there is a surprising paucity of scholarship that actually fo-
cuses specifically on-sets itself the goal of-identifying, exploring, and
evaluating this alleged fact of general American constitutional exceptional-
ism, 7 as distinct from (1) largely assuming it in passing or as the premise of
some other argument or (2) focusing on an individual part of it.' So in this
Article, I seek to take this more systemic or holistic view and explore
whether this sense is an accurate one-whether or to what extent any such
differences that exist justify the overall conception of American constitu-
tional law as exceptional in some basic or fundamental sense.
Immediately, however, I must make explicit a limit on the comprehen-
sive nature of my analysis. In what follows, I will focus on that part of
constitutional law dealing with the protection of rights, as distinct from the
allocation of powers between the various branches and levels of govern-
ment: federalism and separation of powers. The reason for this limitation of
scope is clearly not that these areas hold no interest or importance in them-
selves, nor that there are no significant similarities or differences between
7. Steven Calabresi's A Shining City on a Hill is one of the very few scholarly works to
address the global issue of American constitutional exceptionalism, and he expressly notes this
surprising paucity:
The only substantial book I was able to find that has already applied American exceptionalism
to law is American Exceptionalism and Human Rights .... This book is a collection of short
chapters on specific legal issues and American exceptionalism; it does not address the subject
in the comprehensive way I seek to do here.
Calabresi, supra note 5, at 1340 n.27. Calabresi, however, actually deals with the subject of the
exceptionalism of American constitutional law and doctrine (as distinct from the bulk of the article's
focus on charting the history of the Constitution's social meaning in U.S. political culture) in only
six pages of an eighty-page article. Id. at 1405-10. He also focuses primarily on substantive differ-
ences, rather than on the structural ones that occupy more than half of this Article. Moreover, the
two articles generally come to opposite conclusions about the extent of American constitutional
exceptionalism.
8. Good recent examples of work on specific issues of exceptionalism include Frederick
Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005); Carol Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 57; and Cass Sunstein, Why Does the
American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 90. The book in which these articles are collected focuses primarily
on another individual aspect of exceptionalism: the United States' uniquely ambivalent attitude
towards international human rights law. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra. I
discuss Sunstein's article and the extent to which I disagree with his diagnosis of American excep-
tionalism on social and economic rights. See infra Part V.
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federalism and separation of powers in the United States and in other coun-
tries.9 Apart from space, there are two reasons. First, protection of
fundamental or human rights has been the central driving force behind the
convergence on constitutional fundamentals since 1945. Because this goal
has defined-indeed, created--constitutional law in the modem world, it is
here too that claims of exceptionalism must be anchored and explored. Sec-
ond, this anchoring at least has happened, for it is very widely believed that
what primarily distinguishes U.S. constitutional law from all others is its
exceptional "rights tradition."'0
...... .. ..AJ :l .... .. :. . ,. , ,,.-o .n ,nop, there
WVtiliII Lilia L.IK.I(ther-
are two dimensions to the perceived exceptionalism of the United States.
The first is the substance or content of constitutional rights: what particular
rights exist. The second is the structure of constitutional rights. This struc-
ture is the underlying framework-set of concepts, principles, doctrines, and
institutions-that applies to, organizes, and characterizes constitutional
rights jurisprudence as a whole. I think it is fair to say that there is a sub-
stantial body of opinion inside and outside the United States that views its
rights tradition as exceptional or highly distinctive in both respects."
As far as the substance of constitutional rights is concerned, the claim of
exceptionalism focuses primarily on two well-known features of American
constitutional law. First is the text. Its age and many correspondingly anach-
ronistic concerns (state militias, quartering of soldiers) and omissions
(gender equality), its brevity, its comparatively few enumerated rights, the
vagueness of such central enumerated rights as due process and equal pro-
tection, and the absence of any express limits on rights, all stand in marked
contrast to such paradigmatic post-1945, rights-protecting constitutions as
the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), Canada's Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (1982), and South Africa's Final
Constitution (1996). Second is the unusually high value attributed to free
speech and related rights, and the corresponding lower priority (or outright
rejection) of competing rights or values, such as reputation, privacy, the in-
dividual and/or collective harm caused by certain types of speech, and
access by the electorate to a full range of political views. 2
9. Although I do think that these differences are ultimately more of the expected micro-
rather than macro-variety. For good introductions, see NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 212-488 (2003); VIcKI C. JACKSON & MARK
TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 778-1166 (2d ed. 2006). For an excellent non-
introductory discussion of comparative separation of powers, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Sepa-
ration of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights
in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 1, 10 ("[The United States
has] a rights tradition that has always been different from those of other democratic states."); Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483 (2003) ("America has a
distinctive rights culture, growing out of its peculiar social, political, and economic history.").
11. On substantive differences, see infra Part I. For scholarship claiming that the United
States has an exceptional structure of constitutional rights, see works cited infra Parts H-V.
12. See infra Section IB; see also Schauer, supra note 8, at 29.
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Beyond these two major perceived differences concerning the substance
of rights, there are a few additional ones. The current constitutional position
of religion in the United States creates a virtually unique combination of a
high level of separation between church and state (notwithstanding some
recent lowering 3) and a comparatively low level of protection of religious
freedom (at least after Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith 4). Yet this occurs in such an unofficially non-secular public
and political culture that the United States is arguably the only Western
country in which an avowed atheist could likely never gain the highest po-
litical office and candidates are required to expound on the role of faith in
their personal development and lives. Another significant substantive differ-
ence is the depth of the anti-Lochner reaction, which has resulted in the near
non-protection of most economic rights in the face of government regula-
tion, such as the right to choose an occupation." Finally, there are the twin
instruments of death: guns and capital punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court
recently affirmed an individual constitutional right to possess firearms for
the first time, although the precise scope and limitability of the right remain
unclear.' 6 The death penalty violates the constitutional rights to life and to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment in all other developed countries except
Japan.1
7
Straddling the substantive/structural distinction 8 is the increasingly
well-known exceptionalism regarding the use of foreign and international
materials in domestic constitutional interpretation. In fact, U.S. exceptional-
ism regarding constitutional interpretation has two other important
dimensions: (1) the greater emphasis on historical understandings of the
text, particularly on original intent; and (2) the relative rarity and question-
able legitimacy of employing a "teleological" or purposive mode of
interpretation that is common in many other countries.' 9
As far as the structure of constitutional rights is concerned, the list of
claimed exceptionalisms is at least as long and even more fundamental. First
13. The lowering has occurred for two reasons. First, there has been increased reliance on
the notion that government may not discriminate against the freedom of speech or association of
religious groups. For example, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995), a public university's prohibition on the use of student activity fees to fund any
religious activity was held to be viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.
Second, some Justices believe that the Establishment Clause only prohibits governmental coercion
on behalf of religion, but not measures that non-coercively endorse or discriminate in favor of one
religion or religion generally. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-46 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
14. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
16. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (finally ruling on the debate be-
tween proponents of an individual and a collective right (only as part of a militia) to own a firearm
under the Second Amendment).
17. See Steiker, supra note 8, at 59.
18. Of course, there is no watertight compartmentalization between the substance and struc-
ture of rights either, but I believe the distinction is still generally helpful.
19. See infra Section I.E.
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is the U.S. adherence to the so-called "American model" of judicial review
rather than the "European model." Very briefly, the former is paradigmati-
cally characterized by decentralized, incidental judicial review performed by
generalist judges via personalized opinions; the latter by centralized, more
abstract judicial review performed by specialist judges via anonymous opin-
ions.20 Second, the United States has a more categorical conception of
constitutional rights as compared to the more flexible, open-ended, and
pragmatic conception employed elsewhere. This difference is said to be
manifested by the U.S. rejection of the near-universal proportionality test for
determining if the government has justified its limitation of a right. 2 Third,
the state action doctrine of American constitutional law is said to result in
the United States having a much sharper public/private split in the scope of
constitutional rights than elsewhere, resulting in a higher wall protecting
private autonomy. In the terminology of comparative constitutional law, the
United States takes a more "vertical" approach to the reach of constitutional
rights into the private sphere and, unlike most other contemporary systems,
rejects all forms of "horizontal effect" on private actors. 2 Fourth is the well-
known axiom that the U.S. Constitution is exclusively a charter of negative
rights, prohibiting the government from doing certain things to its citizens
but rejecting the types of positive constitutional rights that require the gov-
ernment to do certain things, which many other modem constitutions
recognize. Exhibit number one for this claim is the exceptional absence of
social and economic constitutional rights in the United States; exhibit num-
ber two is the exceptional absence of a constitutional right to protection
23from the government.
In a nutshell, the thesis of this Article is that while the perceived wisdom
is largely correct about American exceptionalism concerning the substance
of constitutional rights, it is largely wrong concerning the structure. While
there are currently several clear and sharp differences regarding the former,
this is not so regarding the latter. More specifically, my argument is that
once labels and assumptions are set aside, the structure of constitutional
rights in the United States is far more similar to than different from that of
other developed countries-and far more similar than generally understood.
In particular, whereas on each of the four identified structural issues the
United States is commonly viewed as occupying a relatively extreme and
lone position, I aim to demonstrate that its approach to each is in fact well
within the contemporary constitutional mainstream.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part IM. "Proportionality" is the general concept employed in many countries
around the world for determining whether a government's limitation of a constitutional right is
justified. The tests deriving from this concept vary a little from country to country, but the basic idea
is that such limitations are permissible if, all things considered, they do not impose an irrational,
unnecessary, or disproportionate burden on the right.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
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This partial debunking of the myth of American constitutional excep-
tionalism has several significant implications worth noting at the outset.2
For one, it may help to break down the mutual wall of separation arising
from the perception of the U.S. system-by Americans and non-Americans
alike-as so different in its basic principles and assumptions concerning
rights that nothing tangible is to be gained from deeper engagement with the
other. More particularly on this score, it undermines the particular argument
against use of foreign constitutional materials by U.S. courts that is prem-
ised on exceptionalism. For another, recognizing that the United States is
not exceptional in the structure of its constitutional rights could well have
important substantive effects. As one example, it undercuts the notion that
there are formidable and distinctive structural hurdles to adopting a few so-
cial and economic constitutional rights.
My project in this Article obviously invokes what Mitchel Lasser has re-
ferred to as "the most visible methodological cleavage in contemporary
comparative law: the division between the proponents of similarity-oriented,
and those of difference-oriented, comparison."2 As just described, my enter-
prise here appears to be a similarity-oriented one, but I do not undertake it as a
"proponent" of such scholarship or indeed of the sameness/difference debate.
My concerns in this Article are primarily first-order ones: misconceptions and
inaccuracies about the comparative structure of rights have prevented com-
monalities from being identified and led to a skewed understanding of
important aspects of American and comparative constitutionalism. In addition,
because my task is to challenge a descriptive thesis (albeit one with important
normative implications), I largely limit myself to descriptive and analytical
modes of reasoning: what is the case plus some reconceptualization of struc-
tural issues. Accordingly, the methodological approach of this Article is, in
Ran Hirschl's terminology, "[c]oncept formation through multiple descrip-
tion., 26 As such, its focus is not on providing causal explanations-or
justifications-of either structural similarities or substantive differences,
although I briefly discuss possible explanations in the Conclusion. There
too, I present a fuller discussion of the practical, theoretical, and methodo-
logical implications of my analysis.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly surveys and confirms the
reality of contemporary American exceptionalism concerning the substance
of constitutional rights as well as certain methods of constitutional interpre-
tation. Parts IT to V challenge the conventional wisdom on each of the four
structural claims and, taken together, seek to establish that American excep-
tionalism in this foundational aspect of its rights tradition is largely a myth.
24. I discuss them at greater length in the Conclusion.
25. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 146 (2004). For interesting and helpful essays on the
sameness/difference dichotomy in comparative law theory, see COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).
26. Ran Hirschl, On the Blurred Methodological Matrix of Comparative Constitutional Law,
in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 5, at 39,43 (emphasis removed).
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Part II discusses models and forms of judicial review. The heart of the
Article lies in Parts III to V. Part III considers conceptions of constitutional
rights and their limits; Part IV the issue of state action and horizontal effect;
and Part V negative and positive rights. The Conclusion explains why de-
bunking the myth of American structural exceptionalism matters.
I. SUBSTANTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM
Since the thesis of this Article is that the conventional wisdom is largely
correct on the substantive exceptionalism of certain contemporary constitu-
tional rights in the United States but largely wrong on the deeper, more
enduring matter of its structural exceptionalism, I will naturally be focusing
primarily on the latter. Accordingly, in this Part, I present only a brief survey
of the substantive and interpretive differences. Many, though not all, are
fairly well known, but it will perhaps be a useful exercise to put these differ-




Overall, the U.S. Constitution is exceptional among written constitutions
both in its age and its brevity. It is the oldest currently in effect" and, if not
the shortest (as is sometimes erroneously claimed), is among the shortest at
7591 words including amendments, especially if the frame is limited to
29Western constitutions.
Specifically in terms of constitutional rights, the U.S. Constitution is ex-
ceptional in how few enumerated rights it contains, especially of a
substantive rather than a procedural nature. 3° In addition to the few scattered
27. The only other general list of which I am aware is that of Steven Calabresi, and our lists
are somewhat different. See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 1405-10.
28. Among the next oldest constitutions are those of Norway (1814), Belgium (1831), Lux-
embourg (1868), and Mexico (1917). The British North America Act (now renamed The
Constitution Act) has been in continuous effect in Canada as a "constitutional statute" since it was
enacted by the Westminster Parliament in 1867 and was incorporated as part of the new, repatriated
Canadian Constitution in 1982.
29. The constitution of Libya (1969) contains 1600 words, and the constitution of the Cen-
tral African Republic (1995) approximately 2000 words. Among Western constitutions,
Luxembourg's is the shortest at 5744 words, followed by Denmark (6260 words), the United States
(7591 words), France (7764 words), and Norway (8057 words). Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg,
Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries than Others 9 (Ill. Law & Econ.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. LE03-012, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=456520. By contrast, the Basic Law of Germany contains 24,549 words, the
Italian Constitution 15,043 words, the Austrian 27,939 words, and the Portuguese 32,022 words. Id.
30. This point is, of course, the foundation of John Hart Ely's highly influential theory that
the Constitution overwhelmingly protects process rather than substantive outcomes. JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). As most of the procedural rights have their origins in, and
are distinctive to, the common law, they are not particularly helpful objects of study for the purpose




rights in the main body of the original Constitution,3' the Bill of Rights
enumerates only the substantive rights of free speech, free exercise of relig-
ion, and the right to be compensated for the taking of private property for
public use-apart from the antiquated concerns of eighteenth century war-
fare seemingly dealt with in the Second and Third Amendments. Post-Bill of
Rights, the Thirteenth Amendment ended the inhuman treatment of one
group of Americans by another,32 and four of the remaining amendments
deal with the right to vote.33
These sparsely worded but relatively specific enumerated substantive
rights are, of course, supplemented by several critical, but by comparative
standards exceptionally vague, ones. In particular, the three Delphic phrases
of the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor de-
ny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.4
Almost all other constitutions contain longer lists of more particular liber-
ties35  and an equality provision setting out prohibited bases of
36discrimination. The age, terseness, and vagueness of enumerated rights
31. These are contained in Article I, Section 9 (prohibitions on Congress); Article I, Sec-
tion 10 (prohibitions on the states); and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, §§ 9, 10; art. IN, § 2.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
33. Id. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."); id. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."); id. amend. XXIV, § I ("The
right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice
President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress,
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax
or other tax."); id. amend. XXVI, § I ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.").
34. Id. amend. XIV, § I (emphases added).
35. Although, in addition to specific liberties, some constitutions, such as the German Basic
Law, have been interpreted to contain a general or default right to liberty. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 173-175.
36. E.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 15(l), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. II (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms] ("Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without dis-
crimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability."); GRUNDtESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 3(3) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("No person shall be favored or disfavored because of
sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No
person shall be disfavored because of disability.").
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have, controversially, resulted in significant implication of rights by the U.S.
Supreme Court in modem times. 7
Finally, it is not only rights that have been implied in the United States,
but also limits on rights. This is because, as another example of its textual
exceptionalism, the U.S. Constitution lacks any express limits on the rights
that it contains. Almost all other constitutions contain such express limits,
either in the form of a general limitations clause applying to all rights or
specific limitations clauses applying to particular rights." This lack of ex-
press limits has not, contrary to well-known textualist arguments, resulted in
rights being deemed absolute but rather in the judicial implication of limits.
As I will argue in Part III, this perceived need to imply limits in the absence
of express ones plays an important role in explaining certain relatively su-
perficial differences between the United States and other countries on the
structural issues of the conception of constitutional rights and the methodol-
ogy of rights analysis.
B. Freedom of Speech and Expression
Although within the United States it is well known that Justice Hugo
Black failed to establish an absolute understanding of the First Amendment
fight to free speech-that no law abridging the freedom of speech means no
law9-this knowledge is largely lost on outsiders, who find it hard to see the
difference. For one of the paradigmatic contemporary exceptionalisms of
American constitutional law is the higher value placed on free speech and
the lower value placed on conflicting rights, values, and interests than any-
where else. The U.S. Supreme Court has never officially pronounced a
hierarchy of rights and values, unlike the German and South African consti-
tutional courts (which place human dignity at the top),4° but its jurisprudence
37. This is especially true under the doctrine of substantive due process, in the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection, in the categories of heightened scrutiny under equal protection, and
with respect to the right to travel.
38. For example, the Canadian Constitution contains a general limitations clause. Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 36, § I ("The Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."). An example
of a specific or special limitations clause is provided by Article 11(2) of the German Constitution,
which concerns the right to freedom of movement:
This right may be restricted only by or pursuant to a law, and only in cases in which the ab-
sence of adequate means of support would result in a particular burden for the community, or
in which such restriction is necessary to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free
democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, to combat the danger of an epidemic, to
respond to a grave accident or natural disaster, to protect young persons from serious neglect,
or to prevent crime.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 11(2) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY (2000).
39. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring); see also Hugo
L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960).
40. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 32 (2d ed. 1997) ("The principle of human dignity, as the Constitutional
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leaves little doubt about the unofficial one. Across the broad range of sub-
stantive free speech issues, the United States takes an exceptional position in
favor of unregulated and unregulable speech.
Rather than chart this entire range, I will briefly review some of its most
prominent and visible peaks.' Whereas most Western countries permit some
significant form of "hate speech" regulation, including laws making it a
criminal offence to deny the Holocaust or to incite racial or religious ha-
tred,4' almost all such laws run afoul of the First Amendment as
impermissible content-based regulation. 3 Under existing doctrine, only
speech that is directed at inciting or producing imminent lawlessness may be
regulated." Avoiding the individual, social, psychological, and cultural
harms that hate speech undeniably causes is either not seen as a compelling
public interest that can in principle justify speech restrictions, or such re-
strictions are deemed an unnecessary means of promoting this goal.45
Similarly, the United States is exceptional in the extent to which it pro-
tects defamatory speech. Under the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan and
its subsequent extensions, laws imposing liability on those who defame
government officials or other public figures are constitutionally permissible
only when such speech is made with "actual malice"-that is, knowledge
that the statement is false or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.46 This
rule has expressly been considered and rejected under both the Canadian
Court has repeatedly emphasized, is the highest value of the Basic Law, the ultimate basis of the
constitutional order .... ); see also Christian Starck, Menschenwfirde als Verfassungsgarantie im
modernen Staat, 36 JURISTENZEITUNG 457 (1981); Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969)
(F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra, at 299 ("Human dignity is at the very top of the value order
of the basic law. This commitment to the dignity of man dominates the spirit of Article 2 (1), as it
does all other provisions of the Basic Law."). The South African Constitutional Court has stated:
"The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other
personal rights in chap. 3 [i.e., the South African bill of rights]." S. v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC) at 451 (S. Afr.). In the United States, Justice Brennan was well known for making a similar
argument, but it has never been accepted as the official position of the Supreme Court. See William
J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV.
433 (1986).
41. For another recent review, see Schauer, supra note 8.
42. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding the constitutionality of
§ 319(2) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the willful promotion of hatred towards any section
of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion, or ethnic origin); Holocaust Denial Case, 90
BVerfGE 241 (1994) (F.R.G.) (upholding Section 130 of the Criminal Code, which creates the crime
of criminal insult).
43. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that a bias-motivated
crime ordinance was an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a ban on the American Nazi Party marching through a town with
a large population of Holocaust survivors violated the First Amendment). But see Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment permits the state to outlaw cross burnings
done with the intent to intimidate because of the specific history of cross burning as a signal of
impending violence).
44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 501-09 (1951).
45. The latter was the rationale in R.A. V
46. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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47• 48Charter47 and Australian Constitution as insufficiently protecting the con-
flicting values of reputation and dignity, a position mirrored in most other
countries, including Germany. 9
Somewhat ironically, given New York Times's rationale of ensuring "that
• ,,50
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, the
combined real-world effects of the First Amendment on the regulation of the
mass media and of political campaign expenditures are to ensure that this
debate is largely conducted about and among the various multi-millionaires
or hugely successful fundraisers running for highest public office. Thus, on
the one hand, the exceptional understanding of the right to free speech as
permitting at most only very limited regulation of broadcasting companies"
means that the common ban elsewhere on paid political advertisements in
favor of free, mandated airtime for electoral candidates" would be unconsti-
tutional in the United States. As a direct result, only those with the
wherewithal to pay for such ads are plausible candidates. On the other hand,
the exceptional inability to limit campaign expenditures because it violates
the First Amendment 53 ensures that each election season sees ever-higher
economic barriers to entry for public office. Elsewhere, this skewing of de-
mocratic elections by the exigencies and dangers of fundraising is
commonly rejected in favor of a conception of free speech that requires ac-
cess by the citizenry to the full range of political views. As a result, both
broadcasting regulation and limits on campaign expenditures are either con-
stitutionally permissible or mandatory.1
4
The final free speech exceptionalism I will mention, although there are
several others, is that in the conflict between the freedom of the press to
report on criminal proceedings on the one hand, and both the right of the
accused to a fair trial and the privacy interests of crime victims on the other,
47. Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, para. 122-26 (Can.).
48. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (holding that under
the implied constitutional right to freedom of communication, false statements in the context of
political reporting are constitutionally protected only if "reasonable in the circumstances").
49. See Mephisto, 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) (F.R.G.); Boll, 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980) (F.R.G.).
50. 376 U.S. at 270.
5 I. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1973)
(rejecting a broad right of access to private broadcasting in favor of the widest editorial and journal-
istic freedom consistent with its public obligations).
52. See, e.g., FRITZ PLASSER WITH GUNDA PLASSER, GLOBAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING: A
WORLDWIDE ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR PRACTICES 225 (2002) ("[T]he
majority of Western European democracies have placed a ban on paid political advertising on pub-
lic, as well as private, commercial networks [in favor of mandated free airtime].").
53. For the United States, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam). For a
list of countries which limit campaign expenditures, see PLASSER & PLASSER, supra note 52, at 163
("Limitations on campaign expenditures can be found in Canada, New Zealand, Belgium, France,
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, Israel, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Poland,
Hungary, Turkey, Venezuela, Mexico, Chile, India, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.").
54. On the constitutional duty to regulate broadcasting in Germany, see Television I Case, 12
BVerfGE 205 (1961) (F.R.G.).
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the United States stands alone in the degree to which it favors the former.5
Indeed, this exemplifies the more general difference that the constitutional
presumption against prior restraint on publication is exceptionally strong in
the United States. 6
C. Religion
To many, the United States is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma" on the topic of religion in public life. It has by far the largest per-
centage of believers and active worshippers of any developed country.
5 7
Despite the constitutional ban on religious tests for public office," it un-
doubtedly has one defacto given that, among Western countries, only in the
United States must political leaders go through the public ritual of confess-
ing their religious faith and would a professed atheist be politically
disqualified from office. And this in a country that, apart from funds raised
or made, otherwise and exceptionally has no particular qualifications or ex-
perience as prerequisites for high political office. Yet despite, or perhaps
because of, these political and cultural facts, the constitutional position of
religion in the United States is exceptional for the low level of protection it
is currently afforded.
Thus on the one hand, the Establishment Clause59 has generally been in-
terpreted to prohibit state support for (or connection to) either religion in
general or particular religions, placing it close to the secular pole on a spec-
trum of actual or possible positions, perhaps third only to the well-known,
affirmatively secularist regimes of France and Turkey. And on the other
hand, after the changed position or clarification in Employment Division v.
Smith, the freedom to act on one's religious convictions is arguably less pro-
tected in the United States than in most other Western countries, including
France and Turkey as member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights ("ECHR").
Several constitutional rights regimes, including the Canadian and the
ECHR, have no equivalent provision to the Establishment Clause at all and
55. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530-41 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g. Co., 443
U.S. 97, 100-06 (1979). By contrast, in most of the rest of the world, various forms of "sub judice"
rules backed by judicial "contempt orders" are constitutionally permissible. See, e.g. IAN CRAM, A
VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONS 77-122 (2002) (comparing sub
judice rules in the United States with those of Commonwealth countries).
56. N.Y Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 716-20 (1971) (per
curiam) (holding that the ban on prior restraint even extends to classified government information
leaked to the press); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
57. A recent study of fifty countries from around the world identified the United States as
having the lowest percentage (three percent) of people who identified themselves as atheists, agnos-
tics, or non-believers in God. Phil Zuckerman, Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ATHEISM 47, 56-57 (Michael Martin ed., 2007). Vietnam, at eigh-
ty-one percent, had the highest. Id.
58. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
59. Id. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religionn...
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contain only a right to free exercise of religion. Indeed, twelve out of the
forty-seven current member states of the ECHR, including the United
Kingdom, Norway, and Greece, have officially established religions.r6 Many
other Western countries do have constitutional bans on established religions,
but still clearly permit even-handed support for religion as a whole, and in
some cases special privileges. For example, Article 137(6) of the German
Constitution grants certain religious bodies the right to levy taxes on their
members that are collected by state governments. 6' And apart from the
United States, France, and Turkey, almost all Western countries permit or
require some form of religious education in public schools.
On free exercise, the current U.S. constitutional position is that only
state action targeting religious practice is subject to strict scrutiny, while the
many more general laws that incidentally burden religious practice are sub-
ject to ordinary rational basis review. 6' Accordingly, no accommodation of
religious practice is constitutionally required, and the state's duty is essen-
tially one of neutrality of intent. Few other countries draw such a distinction
between purpose and effect in their constitutional treatment of religious
freedom. In defining the scope of the freedom, they tend to focus on the mo-
tivations of the individual (is this religiously motivated conduct?) rather than
on the motivations of the government in regulating. As a result, special pro-
tection is commonly afforded the freedom to act on one's religious
convictions, and exceptions from general laws that burden such actions are
often constitutionally mandated under the proportionality test, which is
63
more stringent than the U.S. rational basis test used for incidental burdens.
60. In the United Kingdom, the established religions are: in England, the Church of England;
in Scotland, the (Reformed) Church of Scotland. The Church of England was disestablished in
Wales in 1920. In Greece, Article 3 of the Constitution states that: "the prevailing religion in Greece
is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ." 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] § 2, art. 3,
cl. 1 (Greece), translated in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF GREECE (2003). In Nor-
way (as well as Iceland and Denmark), the Lutheran Church is the official state religion.
61. GRUNDQESETZ [GG] art. 137(6) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("Religious societies that are corporations under public law shall be
entitled to levy taxes on the basis of the civil taxation lists in accordance with land law.").
62. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
63. See KoMMasERS, supra note 40, at 584-85 n.8 ("The wide berth granted to the value of free
exercise seems greater in Germany than in the United States .... German constitutional doctrine
requires a higher measure of accommodation than does American doctrine."). Compare Smith to the
(German) Blood Transfusion Case, 32 BVerfGE 98 (1971) (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra
note 40, at 449, in which the FCC invalidated the criminal conviction of a husband for failing to
provide assistance when his wife died after they had both refused a blood transfusion for her based
on their religious convictions. The FCC stated, "The duty of all public authority to respect serious
religious convictions.., must lead to a relaxation of criminal laws when an actual conflict between
a generally accepted legal duty and a dictate of faith results in a spiritual crisis for the offender... "
Id. at 451. Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court, in a case involving parents' refusal to permit a
blood transfusion for their child on religious grounds, found that the Children's Protection Act "se-
riously infringed on the appellants' freedom to choose medical treatment for their child in
accordance with the tenets of their faith" under section 2(a) of the Charter, granting the "freedom of
conscience and religion." Although the Court ultimately upheld the Act as justified under section 1
of the Charter, the burden of justication placed on the Canadian government was greater than under
the rational basis test, which would apply to such a case in the United States. B. v. Children's Aid
Soc'y, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, 322 (Can.). The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") has
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Thus, for example, while certain types of post-9/11 regulations around the
world, which "target" either Muslim clothing or the wearing of religious
symbols more generally, may still be subject to at least as high a presump-
tion of unconstitutionality in the United States as elsewhere, this is not true
of many other types of general regulations burdening religion-including
those at issue in Employment Division v. Smith (a general drug law) and City
of Boerne v. Fores64 (a zoning ordinance).
D. Guns, Jobs, and Scaffolds
Three final areas of U.S. substantive exceptionalism are the rights to
choose an occupation, to own a gun, and not to be subject to cruel and un-
usual punishment.
Ever since the demise of the Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme Court has
lumped all forms of social and economic regulation together for the purpose
of determining whether it interferes with the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and uniformly
applied its lowest standard of scrutiny. The result is that no such regulation
has been held unconstitutional since 1936. Indeed, many have wondered
whether it is even correct to say there are constitutional rights at stake in this
65
area.
Several of the canonic American cases involved what would typically be
thought of in other Western constitutional systems as the independent consti-
tutional right to choose an occupation. Thus, The Slaughter-House Cases
upheld a state law conferring a monopoly on one slaughterhouse and stock-
yard facility and requiring all competitors to cease doing business,66 and
Ferguson v. Skrupa upheld a state law prohibiting all but lawyers from engag-
• - 67
ing in the business of debt adjusting. As epitomized by Ferguson, the
modem approach is that the ousted loan makers have no substantial consti-
tutional right claim and that the state's economic regulation is entitled to the
high level of deference embedded in the ordinary rational basis test.
By contrast, in many other Western countries, such a claim would fall
under the independent constitutional right to choose an occupation, a more
significant right than in the United States.6' Although far from absolute, this
stated that, under Article 9 of the ECHR, "[wlhile religious freedom is primarily a matter of individ-
ual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to 'manifest [one's] religion.' Bearing witness in
words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious convictions." Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6, 17 (1993) (alterations in original).
64. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
65. These seemingly included Justice Black who, in his opinion for the Court in Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), omitted any reference to even a minimal rational relation test for
social and economic regulation, thus suggesting that there was no constitutional right the infringe-
ment of which needed to be justified. This omission was underscored by Justice Harlan's brief
concurrence stating only that this test had been satisfied. Id. at 733 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66. 83 U.S. (16 Well.) 36 (1873).
67. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
68. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 12(l) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BAsic LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their
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right is nonetheless protected more rigorously under the standard test of
proportionality than in the United States and has, on occasion, resulted in a
• • • 69
finding of unconstitutionality. This right to choose an occupation in the
first place-concerning the ability of the government to restrict entry into a
trade or profession-is to be distinguished from the generally lesser right to
practice an ongoing occupation as one sees fit, free of regulation.o Even this
lesser economic right is, however, arguably still more protected elsewhere
under the "minimal impairment" prong of the proportionality test than it is
in the United States.7
The U.S. Supreme Court finally ruled for the first time on what had been
the open question of whether there is an individual constitutional right to
bear arms, an issue that arouses great passion and controversy. This latter
point is sufficient by itself to distinguish the United States from other West-
ern countries, where gun ownership is comparatively rare and tends not to
be a subject that triggers-excuse the pun-the emotions. In the end, al-
though the Supreme Court has undoubtedly increased the difference by
finding that there is an individual constitutional right to possess a firearm,
much is still uncertain because it was vague on the scope of the right and
occupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of training."); SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI
[SP] [Constitution] § 18 (Fin.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND (1999), available at
http://www.om.fd21910.htm ("Everyone has the right, as provided by an Act, to earn his or her
livelihood by the employment, occupation or commercial activity of his or her choice."); BUNDES-
VERFASSUNG [BV], CONSTITUTION [Cst] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 27 (Switz.), translated in
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SwIss CONFEDERATION (2002), available at http://www.admin.ch/
org/polit/00083/index.html?lang=en ("Economic freedom is guaranteed. It contains particularly the
freedom to choose one's profession, and to enjoy free access to and free exercise of private eco-
nomic activity.").
69. As David Currie states: "[T]he [German] Constitutional Court has struck down as unwar-
ranted infringements on occupational freedom an impressive array of restrictions that would pass
muster without question in the United States today." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 302 (1994). Among the many examples he gives are the follow-
ing:
The state may not limit the number of drugstores on the ground that there are already enough
of them or license taxicabs only in cases of special need. It may not require vending machines
to be shut down after stores are closed or require barbers who close on Saturday afternoon to
shut down on Monday morning too.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. See, e.g., Pharmacy Case, 7 BVerfGE 377 (1958) (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra
note 40, at 274.
71. Thus, in the Chocolate Candy Case, 53 BVerfGE 135 (1980) (F.R.G.), translated in
KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 279, the FCC invalidated a federal consumer protection statute that
banned the sale of foodstuffs that might be confused with products made of pure chocolate. Al-
though the court acknowledged that, under its lower level of scrutiny for laws restricting the practice
of a trade (as distinct from those restricting the freedom to choose a trade), the legislature is granted
wide discretion in setting economic policy, nonetheless it found that "the legislature has exceeded
the proper bounds of its discretion, for less restrictive means [labeling] can easily achieve the pur-
pose of the statute." Id. at 280. This sort of law would easily pass muster under the U.S. rational
basis test.
72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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chose not to address the important issue of what standard of scrutiny applies
to government limitations of the right.
73
Finally, there is the well-known exceptionalism surrounding the death
penalty.74 Among other Western industrialized countries today, only Japan
permits and carries out the death penalty. Most constitutions either expressly
prohibit the death penalty or contain provisions banning inhumane and de-
grading punishment, which have been interpreted to include the death• 75
penalty in all circumstances.
E. Constitutional Interpretation
The final area of undoubted and well-known contemporary American
exceptionalism straddles the substance/structure dichotomy: namely, meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation. In particular, both a raging
legal/political controversy and a cottage academic industry have recently
arisen76 following the first citation by the Supreme Court in a majority opin-
ion of foreign/international constitutional cases,77 as well as the slightly less
unprecedented practice of referring to foreign and international laws.78
73. Cf Adam Winkler, Scrutizining the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REv. 683, 716-19
(2007) (demonstrating that under state constitutional rights to bear arms, state courts have generally
upheld reasonable regulations of guns).
74. See generally Steiker, supra note 8, at 57.
75. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 102 (ER.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("Capital punishment is abolished."); Protocol No. 13 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 3,
2002, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/
0/englishanglais.pdf (prohibiting the death penalty under all circumstances). The Supreme Court of
Canada has held that the death penalty inherently violates the prohibition in section 12 of the Char-
ter against any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. See United States v. Bums, [2001] 1
S.C.R. 283, 285, 2001 SCC 7 (Can.).
76. The initial round of the current judicial skirmish occurred in Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997), in which Justice Breyer's dissent referred to comparative federal experience as
casting "an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem."
Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, responded that "such com-
parative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution." Id. at 921 n.11
(majority opinion). Subsequent rounds have been fought by these two Justices in both judicial and
extra-judicial contexts, with certain other Justices, including Kennedy, O'Connor, and Ginsburg,
also weighing in on behalf of the Breyer position in various fora, and Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Judge Richard Posner supporting Scalia. Following Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(1992), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), several congressional proposals were launched
to prohibit federal courts from citing foreign constitutional cases, though none has been enacted. For
academic contributions to the debate, see, for example, David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in
Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 539 (2001); Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse,
Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 271 (2003);
Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39
TEx. INT'L L.J. 353 (2004).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing decisions of the ECtHR).
78. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577-78 (2005) (invalidating juvenile death
penalty and referring to UK law and international human rights treaties). Until the early 1960s, the
Supreme Court referred to foreign criminal procedure and practices under its "fundamental fairness"
standard for interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 US. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (discussing the changed approach). As the majority
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Regardless of its merits or outcome, this controversy is obviously a testa-
ment to the fact that such use of foreign constitutional materials is hardly
normal or routine in the United States, as it increasingly is elsewhere.
As is well known, the Constitutional Court of South Africa is required
by an express constitutional provision to consider the decisions of interna-
tional courts in interpreting its own constitution and is permitted to consider
those of foreign courts, which it typically does quite comprehensively.7 9
Similarly, the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998 requires British
courts to "take into account" the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR") in interpreting and applying its substantive provisions.'o
The German Federal Constitutional Court ("FCC") has also required courts
to take into account decisions of the ECtHR in interpreting the Basic Law."
The Supreme Court of Canada routinely canvasses the decisions of foreign
constitutional courts, including a usually quite extensive discussion of rele-
vant U.S. jurisprudence-if often only to reject it. s2 So too, although slightly
less frequently, does the Indian Supreme Court." To immediately identify
the red herring, in none of these countries is the domestic constitutional
court bound by foreign decisions; the power-and sometimes the duty-is
rather to consider and take them into account for whatever relevance and
lessons they may hold.
opinion in Roper noted, the Court has referred to foreign laws under its Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence since Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958). Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
79. Article 39(1) states, "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum ...
(b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law." S. AFR. CONST. 1996
§ 39(1). For a good example of the typically extensive discussion of foreign constitutional decisions,
see S. v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
80. The Act states:
A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention
right must take into account any (a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the
European Court of Human Rights... whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the
court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen."
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 § 2(1) (U.K.).
81. Gorgdloi v. Germany, 111 BVerfGE 307 (2004) (F.R.G.), partially translated in Mattias
Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 5, at 281 ("[T]he Convention provision as inter-
preted by the ECtHR must be taken into account in making a decision; the court must at least duly
consider it."). Kumm's article provides further discussion of the case. Kumm, supra, at 280-81.
82. See, e.g., Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, paras. 122-141 (Can.)
(discussing and rejecting the rule in New York 7imes); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 738, 743
(Can.) (concluding in a section of the judgment entitled, "The Use of American Constitutional Ju-
risprudence,' that the "uniquely Canadian vision of a free and democratic society" requires the court
to depart from the American view that the suppression of hate speech is incompatible with the guar-
antee of freedom of expression); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 52-53 (Can.) (rejecting
relevance of U.S. debate over substantive versus procedural due process for purposes of interpreting
scope of "fundamental justice" under section 7 of the Charter).
83. See, e.g., Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 S.C.R. 518 (India) (discussing
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); Satpathy v. Dani, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1025,
1036-38 (India) (discussing Miranda warnings); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pradip Tandon, A.I.R.
1975 S.C. 563 (India) (discussing, inter alia, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937));
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530, 592 (India) (discussing Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause).
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U.S. interpretive exceptionalism does not, however, begin and end with
the use of foreign and international materials as one might infer from the
current focus on this issue. It also encompasses both the greater use and im-
portance of history-in particular, original intent and/or understanding-and
the lesser use and legitimacy of the "purposive" or "teleological" method of
reasoning that is common, and often dominant, elsewhere. Prior to the mod-
em revival of originalism about twenty years ago, the U.S. approach to
historical methods of reasoning, summed up in Brown's famous verdict that
"[a]t best, they are inconclusive," was more in line with other countries."
Since then, however, the rise of originalism in the United States has gone so
far that even such an avowed anti-historicist in statutory interpretation as
Justice Scalia has on occasion engaged in detailed exegeses of the Federalist
16Papers in constitutional cases. Textualism and originalism have tended to
merge in practice in recent years, with the original meaning of the text com-
ing to predominate over the current. It is obviously a curious fact that
constitutional courts elsewhere, when interpreting the provisions of rela-
tively recent constitutions-including some written in the last decade-
should generally eschew an interpretive method (i.e., originalism) so heavily
relied upon by a court interpreting a 219-year-old document.87
The purposive or teleological approach to constitutional interpretation is,
roughly speaking, an approach that looks to the present goals, values, aims,
and functions that the constitutional text is designed to achieve. Although a
version is certainly endorsed by some U.S. judges and commentators in the
84. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
85. But cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 852-54
(1989) (claiming that originalism was always a major method of constitutional interpretation in the
United States-a tradition from which the Warren Court departed).
86. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997), with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Scalia, J., for the Court).
87. Thus, for example, the German Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Canada
have generally afforded minimal and nonconclusive weight to "originalist" reasoning. The FCC has
stated that "[n]either original history nor the ideas and intentions of the framers are of decisive im-
portance in interpreting particular provisions of the Basic Law. Since the adoption of the Basic Law,
our understanding of the content, function, and effect of basic rights has deepened." Life Imprison-
ment Case, 45 BVerfGE 187 (1977) (F.R.G..), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 307; see
also KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 42-43 ("Original history [in Germany] performs, at best, the auxil-
iary function of lending support to a result already arrived at by other interpretive methods. When
there is conflict, however, arguments based on text, structure, or teleology will prevail over those
based on history."); Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthro-
pology: Some Remarks From a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. (1994) 395, 401
("Historical analysis ... generally serves only as a secondary, supplementary way of clarifying a
rule's meaning."). The Canadian Supreme Court has generally also given minimal weight to
originalist reasoning in favor of a purposive approach. Thus it stated:
Another danger with casting the interpretation of s.7 in terms of the comments made by those
heard at the Special Joint Committee Proceedings is that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and
values embodied in the Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption
with little or no possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal
needs.... If the newly planted "living tree" which is the Charter is to have the possibility of
growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials ... do
not stunt its growth.
In re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [198512. S.C.R. 486, 509 (Can.).
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form of "living constitutionalism," it is neither as widely and overtly em-
ployed nor deemed of generally uncontested legitimacy as in many other
(although not all) countries. Indeed, in some, including Germany, Canada,
South Africa, and Israel, it is not only an orthodox but probably the domi-
nant approach to constitutional interpretation."
Having completed my survey of the ways in which the substance of con-
stitutional rights affirms the reality and extent of American exceptionalism, I
now aim to lay bare its mythical elements by turning to the deeper, struc-
tural aspects of the U.S. rights tradition.
II. THE AMERICAN VERSUS THE EUROPEAN MODEL OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
As we have seen, the claim of American exceptionalism in constitutional
law was self-evident and unanswerable prior to 1945 because, as the inven-
tor of modem constitutional supremacy-a constitution containing a bill of
rights that is entrenched, the supreme law of the land, and enforced by the
power of judicial review-the United States was one of the very few coun-
tries that then practiced it. After 1945, however, when this general system
began to be adopted for the first time in western Europe and elsewhere in
order to protect fundamental rights, the institutional structure of judicial
review put in place departed from that of the United States. Instead, these
countries borrowed from the first pre-1945 European prototype: the Austrian
Constitutional Court, which had functioned from 1920 until 1938, although
it did not have a bill of rights to enforce. 89 By the mid-1980s, when almost
all western European countries had made the switch from legislative to con-
stitutional supremacy, including a bill of rights, this Austrian model was so
widely copied or adapted that it became known as the "European model" of
88. Karl Friauf has described the role of teleological interpretation in Germany:
The teleological method is today probably the most important technique of interpretation in
German constitutional law.... The teleological method might also be characterized as 'func-
tional,' because it asks for the function which a certain rule has to accomplish within the
context of the Constitution....
... Today the teleological method asks for the present purpose and the present meaning of a
rule.
Karl Heinrich Friauf, Techniques for the Interpretation of Constitutions in German Law, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPARATIVE LAW 12 (1968). The
Canadian Supreme Court has declared that "the proper approach to the definition of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter was a purposive one." R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, 344 (Can.). The South African Constitutional Court has stated that the Court's interpre-
tation, while paying regard to the language that is used, "is 'generous' and 'purposive' and gives
expression to the underlying values of the Constitution." S. v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at
403 (S. Afr.). The purposive approach is also particularly associated with the influential former
Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak. See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTER-
PRETATION IN LAW (2005).
89. This is because the Austrian Constitution lacked one. The Austrian Court had also been
copied prior to 1945 by Czechoslovakia, and very briefly, by the Spanish Republic before the onset
of that country's civil war. Gardbaum, supra note 6, at 714-15.
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judicial review. By contrast, the rejected American model seemed excep-
tional.
And, to a significant extent, so it was at this particular point in time. But
three things have occurred since that heyday of the contrast to reduce, if not
eliminate, both the relative exceptionalism of the American model and the
primacy of the American/European distinction as the most useful or important
one concerning the institutionalization of judicial review. First, starting in the
early 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, several countries, including
Canada, Ghana, and Malawi (the latter two under their new, post-authoritarian
constitutions) converted from legislative to constitutional supremacy but,
unlike European countries after 1945, adopted the decentralized, American
model of judicial review. Second, the "pure" version of the European model
came under various sorts of pressures resulting in systemic movements in the
direction of the American model. Finally, even more recent developments in
certain countries have created an alternative to the now traditional model of
constitutional supremacy adopted after 1945, and this alternative model also
suggests a new and interesting dichotomy concerning forms of judicial re-
view-strong versus weak-that transcends the older American/European
one.
Before briefly describing these three developments, let me pause to
summarize the well-known differences between the American and European
models of judicial review. 90 The most visible, important, and still sharpest
difference is between the decentralization of the American system, in which
all courts have the power to disapply legislation that conflicts with the con-
stitution, and the centralization or concentration of the European system, in
which only one court (typically called the constitutional court) has this
power.9' Second, in the American system, courts engage only in concrete
judicial review, (that is, decide constitutional issues that are part of a liti-
gated case) whereas in the European model, courts also or only engage in
abstract judicial review (that is, decide constitutional issues referred to them
by a qualified political institution).9' Third, under the American model,
90. Three classic accounts of the differences between the American and European models of
judicial review are ALLAN R. BREWER-CARfAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW (1989);
MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989); and Louis
Favoreu, American and European Models of Constitutional Justice, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 105, 105-19 (David S. Clark ed., 1990).
91. The European Court of Justice has, however, effectively mandated decentralized judicial
review for the purpose of determining whether provisions of national law violate (supreme) EU law.
In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal [Simmenthal 11], Case 106/77, 1978
E.C.R. 629, it held that every national court must set aside any provision of national law that con-
flicts with EU law, regardless of whether they generally have such a power within the domestic
constitutional system.
92. The Canadian Supreme Court, however, is empowered to render advisory opinions in
certain cases. Although courts engage only in concrete review, other institutions may engage in a
form of abstract review. Bruce Ackerman has suggested that presidential signing statements and
Office of Legal Counsel memos can and should be thought of in this way. Bruce Ackerman,
Presentation at the Comparative Constitutional Law Roundtable, George Washington University
Law School (Mar. 7, 2008). Mark Tushnet has argued that in the United States, more generous
developments in standing law plus the availability of temporary and permanent injunctive relief have
[Vol. 107:391
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courts engage in a posteriori judicial review, and they do so without a time
limit; they consider the constitutionality of a law only after it has come into
effect and, moreover, at any time thereafter. Under the European model,
some courts engage (only or also) in a priori review, that is prior to the
promulgation of the law, and under abstract a posteriori review, there is of-
ten a short deadline for seeking review.93 Fourth, under the American model,
with its primarily common law context, majority decision making is the of-
ficial rule, the votes of individual judges are made known, opinions are
personalized and individually signed, and separate concurrences and pub-
lished dissents are extremely common. By contrast, under the European
model, with its primarily civil law context, decisions are traditionally imper-
sonal, officially unanimous, and without separate concurrences or dissents.
Finally, members of the single constitutional court are often appointed by a
supermajority vote of the legislature, a quite different and far less bureau-
cratic process than applies to the appointment and promotion of ordinary
judges within the same countries. This contrasts with the simple majority
vote of the legislature typical of the American model94 and results, according
to some, in both greater political accountability of the judiciary and a less
95polarized, less partisan nomination process.
With the main differences between the two models in mind, we can now
return to the three developments that have largely eliminated whatever claim
to exceptionalism the American model once had. First, the initial wave of
conversions from systems of legislative supremacy to the four fundamentals
of modem constitutional supremacy after 1945 occurred primarily in coun-
96tries with civil law rather than common law orientations. The reasons the
European model of judicial review tends to fit far better within the civil law
tradition (and the American within the common law) are well known and
need not be rehearsed here.97 The net result was a growing imbalance in the
geographical scope of the two models, with the American limited essentially
to the United States, those Latin American countries that had looked to it as
the hero of colonial revolutions in the 1820s and adopted the form of its
made it relatively easy to construct a lawsuit that looks similar to a standard abstract review
proceeding. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
93. Typically, though not exclusively, one month or thirty days.
94. Of course, in the United States itself, the requirement is a simple majority in the Senate
only, and this applies only to federal, not state, judges.
95. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from
Europe, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1671, 1681-82, 1702-04 (2004); Miguel Schor, Judicial Review and
American Constitutional Exceptionalism (Suffolk U. L. School Legal Studies Research Paper Se-
ries, Research Paper 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1081385. Note, however,
the effect of the U.S. Senate's cloture rule requiring a supermajority of sixty votes to end a filibuster
and so get to an up or down simple majority vote on judicial nominees.
96. One important exception to this statement is the Indian Constitution of 1950 (common
law and decentralized judicial review). Although Japan is mostly a civil law country, having bor-
rowed parts of the German Civil Code in the early twentieth century, its 1946 constitution, adopted
under U.S. occupation, institutes decentralized judicial review.
97. See the classic works cited supra note 90. As Brewer-Carias points out, however, the
overlap is not perfect. See generally BREWER-CARfAS, supra note 90.
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public law, and certain Scandinavian countries whose courts almost never
exercised the power.98 In this context, the claim of institutional exceptional-
ism was a plausible one. However, since the mid-1980s, the tremendous new
burst of constitutionalism around the world has been a little more evenly
divided between the two models in terms of how judicial review has been in-
stitutionalized. While most central and eastern European countries have
adhered or reverted to their civil law roots in looking primarily to the German
version of the European model for inspiration and imitation, Canada as well
as several common law countries in Africa, including Ghana, Malawi, and
Nigeria, have adhered to the decentralized American model.
Second, there have been pressures and tendencies within the European
model causing it to converge somewhat towards the American. As Victor
Ferreres Comella has argued, there have been both internal and external
pressures pushing towards decentralization within centralized systems.99
Internally, both the greater uncertainty of whether legislation applies to spe-
cific situations resulting from more abstract, open-ended contemporary
statutes, and the delays inherent in the European model requiring constitu-
tional cases to be referred to the constitutional court, have led ordinary
courts to overstep the line between interpreting and setting aside legislation
by engaging in forced readings of statutes to render them consistent with
constitutional rights.'tm Externally, a decentralized system has essentially
been mandated by the European Court of Justice for the task of reviewing
whether domestic law conflicts with EU law; and, where under the national
constitution international treaties prevail over domestic law, the same is true
of the European Convention on Human Rights. °'
Apart from these moves towards the decentralization of judicial review,
the other characteristics of the European model have also undergone certain
changes that bring it closer to the American. The role of concrete (versus
abstract) judicial review has grown in quantity and importance in more re-
cent times. Approximately ninety-five percent of cases now come to the
FCC through the individual constitutional complaint procedure,' °2 which
was constitutionalized in 1977; and ninety percent of cases decided by the
Spanish Constitutional Court are brought under the broadly similar writ of
amparo, which was reintroduced under the post-Franco constitution in
1978.)03 Similarly, a priori review has shrunk in scope and is now practiced
98. See Jaakko Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of Laws in the Nordic Countries: A
Comparative Perspective, 48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 345 (2000).
99. Victor Ferreres Comella, The European model of constitutional review of legislation:
Toward decentralization?, 2 INT'L. J. CONST. L. (ICON) 461,463 (2004).
100. See id. at 470-73.
101. See id. at 477-78,482-84; see also supra note 91.
102. KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 11.
103. Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 54 (Louis Henkin & Albert J.
Rosenthal eds., 1990); see also Javier Martfnez-Torr6n, Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the
Spanish Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 715 (2001).
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only by the French Conseil constitutionnel, having been abolished in Spain
and Portugal.' 4 Finally, over time, there has been a shift away from the tra-
ditional impersonal, unanimous constitutional decision in centralized
systems, as several courts have begun to permit dissenting opinions. Ger-
many is one notable example, and the influence of the ECtHR in this respect
has further acculturated European lawyers to the practice.
The third and perhaps most interesting recent development is that the
importance of the American/European distinction has not only been reduced
by the forces of convergence described above, but also potentially tran-
scended by a completely new distinction: strong versus weak judicial
review. For within this newer distinction, both the American and European
models are instances of the same, now traditional and mainstream, strong
version of judicial review. The more novel weak form of judicial review is
reflected in what I have elsewhere termed "the new Commonwealth model"
as a third alternative to the American and European models.
Staggered over the last twenty-five years, the three Commonwealth
countries of Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have enacted
variations on the theme of rejecting the standard version of constitutional
supremacy in favor of one that they believe reflects a more appropriate
compromise with their traditions of parliamentary sovereignty. The most
visible and concrete element in this new Commonwealth model is that al-
though each country gives its courts greater powers than previously to
enforce and protect individual rights, it grants the power of the final word on
whether a law that conflicts with a protected right stands or falls to the legis-
lature, and not to the judiciary as in strong review. In Canada, this is the
result of the section 33 override power, enacted as part of the Charter in
1982: a provincial or the federal legislature may by ordinary vote determine
that a statute is the law of the land notwithstanding that it conflicts with one of
the specified Charter rights.'0 4 The mechanism in New Zealand under the Bill
of Rights Act of 1990 is that although courts do not have the power of judicial
review, they have the duty to interpret statutes in line with the protected rights
wherever possible. 7 In effect, this means that the legislature is empowered to
104. See, e.g., Bel6n Barreiro, Judicial Review and Political Empowerment: Abortion in
Spain, in POLITICS AND POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SPAIN 147, 151 (Paul Heywood ed., 1999).
105. Gardbaum, supra note 6. For very interesting and important work on the implications of
the distinction between strong and weak (or "strong-form" and "weak-form," as he prefers to call it)
judicial review, see TUSHNET, supra note 92; Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of
Judicial Review, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1895 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and
"Core" Civil Liberties, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2006); and Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judi-
cial Review: Its Implications for Legislatures, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 213 (2004).
106. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 36, § 33(1) ("Parliament or the
legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the
case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included
in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter."). The renewable override power operates for a period
of five years.
107. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, § 6 ("Wherever an enact-
ment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of
Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.").
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act inconsistently with a right only where its intent to do so is express. Un-
der the United Kingdom's 1998 Human Rights Act, the higher courts are
empowered to declare that a statute is incompatible with a protected right
but not to set it aside.'o Such a declaration, however, is intended to trigger a
parliamentary decision whether to amend or repeal the statute-and has
done so in every case thus far-but without there being a legal duty to do so.
In sum, to the extent that the American model of judicial review was ev-
er exceptional, or thought of as such, that is no longer the case. °9 As a result
of developments since the early 1980s, its geographical scope has expanded
and its gravitational pull on the European model has increased in the face of
various structural and pragmatic pressures. The institutional differences be-
tween the two models remain real and interesting but, from the broader
perspective of strong versus weak judicial review, they have become largely
details of the acceptance or rejection of the full force of the four fundamen-
tals of modem constitutional supremacy.ll0
III. CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS
A second, and more fundamental, claim of U.S. structural exceptional-
ism concerns the general conception of a constitutional right. It is
commonly understood that the United States has a more "categorical" struc-
ture of constitutional rights than other countries."' In what follows, I resist
this general understanding. I argue that, to the contrary, the United States
108. The Act states:
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision [of primary legislation] is incompatible with a
Convention right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.... (6) A declaration un-
der this section ("a declaration of incompatibility")-(a) does not affect the validity,
continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; and (b) is
not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.
Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 §§ 4(2), (6) (U K.).
109. But see Schor, supra note 95 (arguing that the United States is exceptional because of the
lack of political accountability built into both weak judicial review-legislatures have the final
word-and the supermajority appointments process in the European model).
110. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:
Opening up the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
583, 605 (1999) ("I briefly describe Canada's development.., of proportionality ... to illuminate
salient differences between the Canadian 'proportionality' test and the more categorical form of
constitutional analysis employed [in the U.S.]"); Mattias Kumm & Victor Ferreres Comella, What
Is So Special about Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation? A Comparative Analysis of the
Function of State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 241, 278, 286 (Andras Sajo & Renata Uitz
eds., 2005) ("Due to the more categorical structure of constitutional rights in the American constitu-
tional tradition ... [t]he best understanding of the state action doctrine connects it to the more
categorical structure of constitutional rights in the American constitutional tradition."). Similarly, in
the specific context of the First Amendment, Fred Schauer reports that "there is a view, widespread
in Canada, in Europe, and in South Africa, and sometimes seen in other countries as well, that
American free speech adjudication is obsessed with categorisation and definition." Frederick
Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States: A Case Study in




shares the same deep structure, conception, and analysis of constitutional
rights as other modern Western democracies.
A. The Weight of Constitutional Rights Claims
Stated baldly, the claim that the United States is exceptional in that it has
a more categorical structure of constitutional rights is ambiguous; in order to
understand and evaluate it, it is first necessary to distinguish two different
senses of the claim. The first, and perhaps most obvious, sense in which
constitutional rights may be said to be categorical concerns their weight:
rights are absolute and cannot be limited or overridden by competing con-
siderations. Although the near unique absence of express limits on rights in
the U.S. Constitution '12 suggests a textual basis for categorical rights in this
sense, this is, of course, not the case in practice. The U.S. Supreme Court
has long implied limits on most textually unlimited rights, so that only a
small subset of constitutional rights has been held to be absolute. To the ex-
tent these go beyond procedural rights specific to common law systems,"
3
this small subset tends to have equivalents in most other constitutions.'4
This first sense of the categorical claim, involving the weight of constitu-
tional rights, may, however, be restated in nonabsolute terms. Constitutional
rights are more categorical in the United States than elsewhere not because
they are absolute but because, if infringed, they carry a stronger presumption
that the infringement cannot be justified by the government."' But this claim,
too, is far less easy to substantiate than those who make or assume it suggest,
for four reasons.
First, it is of course not true, as the implication seems to be, that in-
fringements of all constitutional rights in the United States are subject to the
strongest presumption of unconstitutionality reflected in the strict scrutiny
test. Many, if not most, constitutional rights are protected by the lesser
presumptions of the undue burden and intermediate scrutiny tests, or by
what is effectively the nonpresumption reflected in the two types of rational
basis tests. H6 In other words, there is no single or uniform weight that
112. See supra text accompanying note 38.
113. Examples of such rights are the rights to jury trial, to confront accusers, and not to be
subjected to double jeopardy.
114. This small subset includes, for example, the rights against cruel and unusual punishment
and against taking of private property without just compensation.
115. For example, Kumm and Ferreres Comella state:
[In the United States,] [i]f a constitutional interest that enjoys protection as a right is infringed
by the government, there is a strong presumption that there has been a violation of that per-
son's right. Only in exceptional cases where a court finds a compelling state interest can this
presumption be overcome.... Saying that an act by public authorities has infringed an interest
protected as a constitutional right does not yet means a great deal in Canada or Germany....
Within proportionality analysis the dice are not loaded substantively in favor of the rights-
holder.
Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 11, at 276-77 (emphases in original).
116. For an account of how few constitutional rights are subject to strict scrutiny, see Adam
Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227 (2006).
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attaches to all constitutional rights in the United States; in this sense of the
term, some are far more categorical than others.
Second, even in the relatively few rights cases to which it applies, the
general strength of the strict scrutiny presumption in the United States and
the difficulty of rebutting it are typically overstated. A recent empirical
study concludes that overall within the federal courts, there is a thirty per-
cent survival rate for government actions infringing any constitutional right
protected by strict scrutiny, and even higher survival rates for certain such
rights. 117
Third, it is inaccurate to suggest that the principle of proportionality
standardly employed outside the United States to determine if infringements
of constitutional rights are justified always or generally involves a single
and lesser-or even no-presumption, rather than a sliding scale depending
on, among other factors, the nature of the particular right infringed."' The
German and South African constitutional courts, together with the ECtHR,
have made clear that infringements of certain (i.e., the most important)
rights carry a more rigorous burden of justification under the proportionality
test than others." 9 Similarly, in applying its proportionality test for rights
violations under The Human Rights Act, the United Kingdom's House of
117. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006).
118. See Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 111, at 276-77 ("Saying that an act by public
authorities has infringed an interest protected as a constitutional ight does not yet mean a great deal
in Canada or Germany. ... Within proportionality analysis the dice are not loaded substantively in
favor of the rights-holder. The proportionality test allows the court to openly consider the respective
competing interests and make a judgment on which of them takes precedence under the circum-
stances.").
119. For example, the FCC stated:
The choice of an occupation is an act of self-determination, of the free will of the individual; it
must be protected as much as possible from state encroachment. In practicing an occupation,
however, the individual immediately affects the life of society; this aspect of [vocational activ-
ity] is subject to regulation in the interest of others and of society .... [Accordingly,] the
[right to] practice an occupation [under Article 12(2)] may be restricted by reasonable regula-
tions predicted on considerations of the common good. The freedom to choose an occupation
[under Article 12(1), which protects the citizen's freedom in an area of particular importance
to a modem society based on the division of labor], however, may be restricted only for the
sake of a compelling public interest... [and] only to the extent that the protection cannot be
accomplished by a lesser restriction on freedom of choice.
Pharmacy Case, 7 BVerfGE 377 (1958) (F.R.G.), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 275-76.
A similar, more rigorous burden of justification also applies to governmental classifications by one
of the enumerated "suspect" traits in Article 3(3): the specific equality provision. See KOMMERS,
supra note 40, at 290. The South African Constitutional Court has also stated:
[L]imitations on constitutional rights can pass constitutional muster only if the Court con-
cludes that, considering the nature and importance of the right and the extent to which it is
limited, such limitation is justified in relation to the purpose, importance and effect of the pro-
vision which results in this limitation ....
Christian Educ. S. Aft v Minister of Educ. 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at 777 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
For the ECtHR, the "margin of appreciation"-the degree of deference accorded to the original
national decisionmaking authority-varies with both the importance of the right interfered with and
the legitimate aimed pursued. See The Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1981) (finding
lesser margin in context of law criminalizing homosexual sodomy because case concerned "a most
intimate aspect of private life").
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Lords has adopted a "variable intensity of review" approach that takes into
account the importance of the particular right infringed.' 20 While not as rigid
as the United States' fixed tier structure, although (as is well known) this
itself is currently in a state of flux, 2' it is nonetheless a variation on the
theme of different presumptions for different rights. Moreover, even the
least important rights are plausibly understood to be more protected under
the minimal impairment prong of the proportionality test than under the or-
dinary U.S. rational basis test.
122
Finally, there is a principle in some continental European countries that
limits on constitutional rights cannot violate the essential core of a right.
121
Although in these countries there is a good deal of scholarly debate about
whether this imposes a limit to limits on rights that is independent of the
proportionality requirement or is part of it,'24 even the latter interpretation
suggests a more "intense" application of proportionality the greater the de-
gree to which the right is infringed. This essential core doctrine has no real
equivalent in the United States. Accordingly, for these four reasons, global
pronouncements about the comparative weight of constitutional rights can-
not be established a priori and are hard to support.
B. The Methodology of Constitutional Rights Claims
The second, and analytically distinct, sense in which the structure of
constitutional rights is claimed to be categorical, or more categorical, in the
United States is a methodological one. Here, the focus is not directly on the
outcome of rights adjudication (as with the previous sense) but on its proc-
ess and style of reasoning. The basic claim is that constitutional rights
adjudication is framed and analyzed through the use of rule-like categories
in the United States, as compared with the more open-ended, contextualized,
and case-by-case analysis practiced almost everywhere else under the test of
120. See Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity, of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
174 (2006).
121. Recent Supreme Court decisions have called into question the previous two-strand analy-
sis under the Due Process Clause: (1) fundamental right/strict scrutiny and (2) non-fundamental
liberty/rational basis test. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (avoiding the questions whether
the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is "fundamental" and what standard of review should be
applied); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (not using the term "funda-
mental" to describe the right to choose an abortion and rejecting strict scrutiny in favor a new
"undue burden" test for restrictions on the right).
122. See, e.g., Chocolate Candy Case, 53 BVerfGE 135 (1980) (F.R.G.).
123. See e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19(2) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("In no case may the essence of a basic right be af-
fected."); CONSTITuCI6N [C.E.] § 53(1) (Spain), translated in SPANISH CONSTITUTION (1992) ("The
rights and freedoms recognized ... are binding on all public authorities. Only by an act which in
any case must respect their essential content, could the exercise of such rights and freedoms be
regulated ...."). The ECtHR has also held that the "very essence" of a Convention right may not be
impaired. Rivers, supra note 120, at 184-87.
124. See, e.g., ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 193-96 (Julian Rivers




proportionality. Thus, American free speech jurisprudence is said to be
uniquely framed and analyzed through such categories as content-based ver-
sus content-neutral speech, protected versus unprotected speech,
commercial versus noncommercial speech, obscenity, "fighting words," and
125
so on.
1. General Styles of Reasoning
Although commonly made, at first glance and as a global assessment
this methodological claim seems somewhat counterintuitive for several rea-
sons. First, it exactly reverses the standard characterizations of general
common law and civil law styles of thinking and reasoning, what Pierre
Legrand has referred to as their irreducibly different "mentalits.'' 6 Thus,
whereas the civil law tradition employs more abstract, conceptual, and cate-
gorical modes of legal thought, the common law tradition muddles through
with pragmatic, contextualized, fact-specific modes of legal argumenta-
tion.127 Even though, as we have seen, the United States is now far from the
only common law country practicing judicial review of entrenched rights,
there seems to be something problematic and paradoxical in thinking of
such reverse discontinuities between the analysis of constitutional rights on
the one hand, and all other legal claims on the other, within the two tradi-
tions.
Second, this characterization of U.S. constitutional rights methodology
flies in the face of standard internal understandings of the Supreme Court as
tending to practice a form of "judicial minimalism"'28 by not prescribing
general rules to guide future action but rather deciding individual cases on
the narrowest grounds provided by the facts. Although defended by a few,
29
this practice is frequently criticized. Recent examples include Grutter v.
Bollinger' (does its holding apply to high school affirmative action policies
or are universities special?); Bush v. Gore' (expressly limited to its facts);
125. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 31, 53-54.
126. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q.
52, 60-62 (1996).
127. See Mirjan Dama~ka, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and
Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1968) (arguing that these differences are re-
flected in the very different styles of legal education within the two traditions).
128. The term is commonly associated with Cass Sunstein. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
129. See, e.g., id.
130. For a relatively early expression of such criticism, see Justice Jackson's concurring opin-
ion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) ("A
judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present them-
selves.... [Clourt decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the
largest questions in the most narrow way.").
131. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
132. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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and, at least in some respects, Lawrence v. Texas'33 (what standard of review
applies to protected liberties, and is morality ever a legitimate or sufficient
justifying objective?).
Third, and perhaps most on point, this characterization does not obvi-
ously seem to fit such a canonical exercise in comparative constitutional
rights analysis as reading Roe v. WadeI34 alongside Germany's First Abortion
Case. 35 Although it is true that, unlike Grutter, Bush v. Gore, and Lawrence,
Roe unusually laid down general and detailed rules to guide future conduct,
this "legislative" aspect of the trimester system was one of the opinion's
most controversial features, and it was overruled in Casey.13 As a result, we
are back to the more usual case-by-case applications, now of the undue bur-
den-rather than the strict scrutiny-standard. Such similar "legislation" by
the FCC in the First (and Second37) Abortion Case is far more common and
less controversial in Germany; indeed, it may be inherent in the function of
abstract review.138
Moreover, in Roe, far from relying on a categorical style of reasoning,
the majority first engaged in consequentialist analysis of the concrete harms
to women caused by forced childbirth, and then openly weighed the various
interests at stake through the lens of current medical and scientific evidence
to arrive at the trimester system. Such empirical analysis of harms was also,
of course, the central feature of the Court's reasoning in Brown v. Board of
Education.3 9
By contrast, in the First Abortion Case, the FCC reached its "legislative"
conclusions through more abstract, almost axiomatic, reasoning concerning
the status of the fetus, the sanctity of life, and the state's duty to protect it.
Thus, the FCC stated that "the duty of the state to protect every human life
may therefore be directly deduced from Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence I,
of the Basic Law."' 4 It also inferred this duty from the general concept of
constitutional rights as an "objective ordering of values,"'' 4' concluded that
aspects of the conflict between the fetus's fight to life and the mother's free-
dom of personality were resolved "a priori"'42 in favor of the former, and
133. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
134. 410U.S. 113(1973).
135. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (F.R.G..), translated in Robert Jonas & John D. Gorby, 9 J. MAR-
SHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976).
136. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (plurality opinion)
("We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of
Roe.").
137. Second Abortion Case, 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993) (ER.G.).
138. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 141-44 (2000).
139. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (F.R.G.), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 135, at 641.
141. Id. at 642. On the German concept of constitutional rights as an "objective order of val-
ues," see infra text accompanying notes 200-201.
142. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
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frequently stated that issues were to be decided as "matters of principle."'
43
In one of the few areas of the opinion in which it referred to empirical evi-
dence, the FCC justified the holding that the right to life in Article 2
included the life of the fetus by declaring: "Life, in the sense of historical
existence of a human individual, exists according to definite biological-
physiological knowledge, in any case, from the 14 h day after conception."'"4
Compare this to Roe's references to the inability of "those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology ... to arrive at
any consensus" on "the difficult question of when life begins.'' 45 And in
reaching its overall decision, the FCC did not engage in much obvious con-
text-specific or empirical weighing of interests, but declared a general rule
of principle that, with only a few exceptions, the legislature must legally
condemn abortion, in most cases through the criminal law.1
46
The strongest case for the methodological claim concerns U.S. free
speech jurisprudence. In this area, courts do appear to frame and analyze
rights claims through such categories as content-based versus content-
neutral speech, protected versus unprotected speech, commercial versus
noncommercial speech, obscenity, and "fighting words." Moreover, into
which of these boxes particular speech falls heavily influences the outcome
of the case, as it determines whether it is protected under the First Amend-
ment at all and, if so, what standard of review applies. In a sense, the claim
recalls earlier battles in the United States over how to interpret the scope of
the Commerce Clause: between proponents of employing such categories as
manufacture versus commerce and direct versus indirect effect on the one
hand, and of looking at the empirical effects on commerce on the other.
1 47
What this observation suggests, however, is that the First Amendment is
not only methodologically exceptional in a comparative sense, as Schauer
argues,148 but it is also exceptional from the perspective of the rest of U.S.
constitutional rights jurisprudence. Elsewhere, and particularly in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, such categories are far less prominent.
Under substantive due process, there are no obvious equivalents, although-
143. E.g., id. at 642.
144. Id. at 638.
145. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159(1973).
146. The FCC stated:
In all other cases [than where the life, health, or social necessity of the mother require an abor-
tion] the interruption of pregnancy remains a wrong deserving of punishment .... If the
legislature wants to dispense... with penal law punishment, this [decision] would be compati-
ble with the requirement to protect of Article 2, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, of the Basic Law,
only on the condition that another equally effective legal sanction stands at its command which
would clearly bring out the unjust character of the act (the condemnation by the legal order)
and likewise prevent the interruptions of pregnancy as effectively as a penal provision.
First Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (F.R.G.), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 135, at
649.
147. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (rejecting a categorical approach in
favor of determining the actual effect on interstate commerce).
148. Schauer, supra note 8.
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to be sure-some liberty interests are protected more than others, such as
intimate and personal autonomy interests versus economic. But that is true of
most other constitutional systems too. Under equal protection, there might
appear to be greater use of framing categories: whether there is discrimination
on the basis of race and gender versus on other bases, such as age or wealth;
or whether there is race-conscious versus race-neutral discrimination. But
these categories are no less employed by other systems. On race, gender, etc.,
the only difference is their source: elsewhere, which types of discrimination
violate the right to equality is typically in the text, 149 whereas in the United
States they are judicially determined. On purpose and effect, many non-U.S.
courts make use of the same distinction, even where what follows from it is
somewhat different.150
Moreover, some of these categories, or other ones, are used in free
speech jurisprudence outside the United States. Thus, the Supreme Court of
Canada also "draws on the U.S. First Amendment distinction"'' 5 ' between
regulation directed at content and content-neutral regulations, with the for-
mer "necessarily" infringing section 2(b) but the latter only if the claimant
demonstrates that the regulated activity promotes one of the principles un-
derlying the guarantee.1 2 It also employs the distinction between common
law and statutory causes of action in free speech cases to determine whether
or not the Charter right applies to them.'53 The FCC distinguishes between
(1) expressions of opinion and representations of fact, and (2) demonstrably
untrue representations of fact versus others for the purpose of determining
whether certain speech is protected at all under Article 5's guarantee of
freedom of expression.
2. A One-Step or Two-Step Approach?
The methodological version of the claim of American categorical excep-
tionalism is sometimes given more specific shape by focusing on the standard
two-step structure of rights adjudication employed throughout the modem
constitutional world. The first step consists of determining whether a constitu-
tional right has been infringed; the second step of whether the government
149. See supra note 36.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 238-239.
151. Kent Roach & David Schneiderman, Freedom of Expression in Canada, in CANADIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 259, 266-67 (Gerald-A. Beaudoin & Errol Mendes eds., 4th
ed. 2005).
152. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 971-77 (Can.).
153. See infra Part IV.
154. Thus, the FCC had held that demonstrably untrue representations of fact are not pro-
tected at all under Article 5. Holocaust Denial Case, 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994) (F.R.G); B61, 54
BVerfGE 208 (1980) (F.R.G.). By contrast, in The Historical Fabrication Case, it held that denying
German responsibility for the outbreak of World War II was an expression of opinion (and so pro-
tected), unlike Holocaust denial (demonstrably untrue representation of fact), which is not protected.
90 BVerfGE 1 (1994) (F.R.G.).
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can justify infringing the constitutional right.'55 As Fred Schauer has argued,
this two-step analysis-distinguishing the definition or coverage of a right




With respect to this two-step analysis, the claim of U.S. categorical ex-
ceptionalism has been made in two different ways. First, it is sometimes
argued that U.S. courts focus all, or almost all, of their attention on the first
step and ignore the second." 7 This reflects a categorical approach because it
focuses on the definition of a constitutional right, rather than on the balanc-
ing or weighing of rights against competing values and interests that is the
distinctive feature of the second step. By contrast, non-U.S. constitutional
courts are said to quickly dispose of the first step by employing a liberal
interpretation of rights and focusing almost all their attention and analysis
on this second step, which involves an open-ended, context-specific, case-
by-case assessment under the various prongs of the near-universal propor-
tionality test."' Second, to the limited extent that U.S. courts engage in
second-step analysis at all, they reject the near-universal proportionality test
in favor of the more categorical, rule-like, fixed tiers or standards of re-
view. ' 9 Thus, U.S. courts are said to employ a narrow conception of both
155. For a fuller descriptions of the two-step process, see Weinrib, supra note 5, at 93-98.
156. Schauer, supra note 111, at 62.
157. The South African Constitutional Court stated:
Our Constitution deals with the limitation of rights through a general limitation clause....
[Tihis calls for a 'two-stage' approach .... In this it differs from the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States .... Although the 'two-stage' approach may often produce the same result as the
[United States'] 'one-stage' approach, this will not always be the case.
S. v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 435 (S. Afr.) (footnotes omitted); see also Kumm &
Ferreres Comella, supra note 11, at 276 ("It is a characteristic feature of American constitutional-
rights discourse that in most areas of the law the focus is generally on thefirst part of the inquiry.
The core question is whether a particular act violates an interest that is protected as a constitutional
right." (footnote omitted)). Schauer has also echoed these sentiments:
Under the American approach [to free speech], it appears as if the sole task is to delineate the
contours of a right which is then to be treated as having infinite stringency, such that all of the
"action," as it were, is at the stage of definition. By contrast, the non-American approach ap-
pears explicitly to authorize a two-step process, in which the first step is to delineate the scope
of the right, and then, if some activity or some governmental restriction falls within that scope,
thereafter to determine whether the limitations are justified according to the designated burden
of justification and the designated proportionality inquiry.
Schauer, supra note 11l, at 51.
158. See Schauer, supra note Ill, at 51.
159. See Kummm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 11l, at 278 ("It would be false to claim that
proportionality analysis and balancing have no role to play in American constitutional law. They
obviously do. Yet it is also clear that, unlike the courts used as a point of comparison here, the Su-
preme Court is more hesitant in its embrace of proportionality analysis and frames inquiries in a
way that appears more legalistic and categorical." (footnote omitted)); see also Jackson, supra note
11, at 603 ("U.S. constitutional law does not ordinarily and explicitly resort to the idea of propor-
tionality as a measure of constitutionality .... "); Weinrib, supra note 5, at 89-105 (suggesting that
proportionality is a central part of postwar paradigm rejected by the post-Warren Supreme Court).
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rights and their permissible limits, whereas other courts employ a broad
conception of both.' 60
This first claim-that, exceptionally, U.S. courts focus exclusively, or
almost exclusively, on the definition/infringement step--once again moves a
little too fast and fails to follow its own prescription of context-specific,
case-by-case analysis in favor of over-generalization. For U.S. constitutional
law is notoriously pluralistic, unsystematic, and clause-bound in its own
doctrines. So while I think Fred Schauer is correct that U.S. free speech ju-
risprudence is more categorical in this sense, reflecting in part as he argues
an exceptionally strong substantive commitment to free speech protection,1
6
it should not be automatically inferred that this approach applies to other
constitutional rights. If we turn again from the First to the Fourteenth
Amendment, from the right of free expression to the rights to liberty and
equality, we frequently see something quite different.
As far back as 1905, in the notorious case of Lochner v. New York,
63
both the majority opinion and Justice Harlan's dissent spent the vast major-
ity of their words on the second-step issue of whether the New York
maximum-hours law was a justified infringement of the bakers' constitu-
tional right to freedom of contract. 6' In as paradigmatic a case as Roe v.
Wade, one of the notable features of the majority opinion (still the subject of
ongoing criticism by both opponents and proponents of abortion) was how
briefly and quickly it concluded that the right to privacy contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause includes the right to choose an abor-
tion 65 before focusing most of its attention on the second-step issue of
whether, when, and for what purposes the government may justifiably limit
and override the right. 6 6 Similarly, in the more recent landmark affirmative
action case of Grutter v. Bollinger, decided under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause, the entire majority opinion and the various
dissenting ones addressed the second-step issue of whether the government
objective of promoting educational diversity justified infringing the plain-
tiff's constitutional right under the colorblind norm not to be discriminated
160. See Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and
Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAw, RIGHTS AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131, 150 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007) ("Another approach is to define
narrowly both the scope and the permissible limitations of the rights. This has been the approach of
the U.S. Supreme Court....").
161. Schauer, supra note 111, at 47-63.
162. Schauer himself makes no such general inference, limiting his account to the First
Amendment. See id.
163. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
164. Lorraine Weinrib considers Harlan's dissent in Lochner as foundational to what she
argues would eventually become the "postwar paradigm," a paradigm of rights-based constitutional
jurisprudence that includes proportionality and was championed by the Warren Court but subse-
quently rejected by the isolationist and exceptionalist Supreme Court of the post-Warren era.
Weinib, supra note 5, at 105-10.
165. Roe v. Wade, 410. U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Only a single paragraph of the fifty-four page
majority opinion was devoted to this issue. Id.
166. Id. at 153-64.
December 2008]
Michigan Law Review
against on the basis of race. In United Building & Construction Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to a "two-
step inquiry" of first determining whether a fight is implicated and infringed
and, second, whether there is "substantial reason" for the infringement.'67
And on the other side of the ledger, is it always, or characteristically,
true that non-U.S. constitutional courts simply rubber stamp the first step
claim of rights infringement in their rush to assess the second stage, at least
where more important rights are concerned? Well, in R. v. Morgentaler, the
Canadian Supreme Court spent a great deal more time than the U.S.
Supreme Court did in Roe on the first-step issue of whether criminalization
of abortion implicated a constitutional right. 6 And in Holocaust Denial, the
FCC addressed the issue of whether demonstrably false representations of
fact are protected speech under Article 5 before concluding that they are not,
thus negating any need for second-step analysis. 
6
1
An important reason why U.S. courts sometimes appear to focus more
on the first step is the (near unique) absence of express limits on constitu-
tional rights. Where all limits are judicially implied, it is far easier to justify
such implication if all limits are thought of as part of the first step, part of
the undoubtedly legitimate judicial function of interpreting the meaning and
scope of a constitutional right, rather than-as many are-part of the second
step of specifying when the right as defined may be overridden by conflict-
ing public policy objectives. This is especially true in the United States
because judicial review and the power of the courts remain deeply con-
tested, unlike in continental Europe. So, for example, although the U.S.
Supreme Court implies both what types of speech or conduct lie outside the
right to "freedom of speech" in the first place (first-step issue) and the cir-
cumstances in which government may promote pubic policy objectives that
conflict with what is inside the right (second-step issue), there is a tendency
for the latter to be conceptualized as part of the definition of the right. Thus,
the right to free speech is, very roughly, defined as the right to be free from
intentional, content-based regulation of noncommercial, expressive activity
that does not amount to obscenity, fighting words, or a clear and present
danger unless the regulation is necessary to promote a compelling govern-
mental interest. Whatever the distortions in self-understanding resulting
from the absence of express limits, however, the practice of the Supreme
Court properly recognizes the reality that what lies on either side of the "un-
less clause" reflects the distinction between "internal" and "external" limits
167. 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984). In this case, the right at issue was the right to non-
discriminatory treatment by State A of a citizen of State B contained in the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV. Id.
168. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 51-73 (Can.).
169. 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994) (F.R.G.). The FCC engaged in a brief second-step analysis of
the separate question of whether, if an utterance of Holocaust denial is considered not by itself but
in connection with a broader argument about the "susceptibility to blackmail" of German politics, it
might then be deemed constitutionally protected expression of opinion. Id. at 250.
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on rights and the standard two steps of modem constitutional rights adjudi-
cation.7 °
The second claim, it will be recalled, is that even to the limited extent
U.S. courts focus on the second step, they still employ the more categorical,
fixed tiers of review methodology and uniquely reject the open-ended, con-
text-specific proportionality test of contemporary constitutionalism. Along
these lines, the United States could be said to reject the principle of propor-
tionality twice over: once by largely ignoring the second step altogether; and
again, when it does not, by using a different second-step test. But on closer
analysis, this second claim is only a little more accurate than the first. Al-
though it is undoubtedly true that the United States employs neither the
label nor the precise content of the proportionality test in constitutional
rights cases,' 7' the differences between the two second-step tests are, for two
reasons, both far less and far less significant than generally claimed.
The first reason is that, as mentioned during the discussion of weight
above, the proportionality test as practiced does not involve a single pre-
sumption that applies to all constitutional rights equally. Even though the
same verbal test-that is, the same various prongs-applies to all, it is ap-
plied in a way that takes into account, among other things, the relative
importance of the particular constitutional right at issue.7 2 In Germany, un-
der the proportionality test, what justifies an infringement, say, of the
general constitutional right to liberty that has been held to include, among
many other things, the right to feed pigeons in public squares, 173 would not
necessarily justify an infringement of the constitutional right to human dig-
nity, the most important constitutional right and value in the Basic Law.1
74
Similarly, what would justify infringing the right to practice an occupation
in the way one wants would not necessarily justify infringing the right to
choose or enter a given occupation in the first place.1
7
170. For more details of this argument. including further explication of the distinction be-
tween internal and external limits on constitutional rights, see Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting
Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REv. 789 (2007).
171. Outside the rights context, the concept of proportionality is used in the United States in
both the dormant commerce clause "balancing test"-whether the burden on interstate commerce is
disproportionate or clearly excessive relative to the local benefits-and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-is Congress's measure so disproportionate to any state violations as to go beyond
remedy or prevention into "substantive" regulation? Even in the rights context, proportionality is
arguably an implicit part of the "undue burden" test for both First Amendment and abortion cases. In
contrast, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected proportionality as part of the test for "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965
(1991) ("We conclude... [that] the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.").
172. See supra text accompanying note 118.
173. Mattias Kumm mentions this case, 54 BVerfGE 143, 147 (1980) (F.R.G.), as an example
of the "mundane things" that the FCC has held are included within the general right to liberty de-
rived from the right to the "free development of... personality" under Article 2(l)-understood as
the right to do or not to do whatever you please. See Kumm, supra note 160, at 141.
174. See supra note 40.
175. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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Accordingly, the difference between (1) this sliding scale, or "variable
intensity of review," approach to the criteria of justification for limiting
rights depending on, among other things, the importance of the right in
question; and (2) the U.S. approach of formally different standards of re-
view, including different verbal tests, for different rights is far less than
would be the case with a single justificatory weight applying to all rights.
Indeed, Justice Thurgood Marshall was well known for arguing that the slid-
ing scale metaphor provided a more accurate view of equal protection
jurisprudence in the United States than that of fixed tiers of review.'7 6 And
equally well known is Justice John Paul Stevens's view that "[t]here is only
one Equal Protection Clause" with a single standard that applies differently
in different contexts, and not two or three.'77 The fact that these two Justices'
accounts are intended to be descriptive of the very same body of case law as
the fixed tiers of review conception further suggests that the actual structure
of the U.S. and non-U.S. tests are not so very different.
The second reason is that, labels aside, the actual contents of the U.S.
tiers of review and proportionality tests are not so very far apart. As Vicki
Jackson notes:
While the language of "proportionality" is not generally used in the United
States, the underlying questions-involving the degree of fit between the
claimed objective and the means chosen, and a concern for whether the in-
trusion on rights or interests is excessive in relation to purpose-are
already an important part of some fields of U.S. constitutional law, espe-
cially equal protection, and free speech. The simplicity of the underlying
idea of proportionality in U.S. constitutional law may be obscured by the
several doctrinal forms of multi-factored tests in which it is embodied.
78
Similarly, David Beatty has argued that the decisions in Lochner, Brown,
and Roe demonstrate that the proportionality test, which he refers to as the
ultimate rule of law, is "as American as apple pie" and that the proportional-
ity principle "is as much a part of the rule of law in America as anywhere
else.'
7 9
The contents of the proportionality inquiry, as the basic tool for deter-
mining whether limitations on rights are justified, are fairly standard among
the countries expressly employing it. One variation, however, is that certain
countries and regimes employ a more formalized-dare one say, categori-
cal-version, in which the various prongs of the test are considered
176. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
177. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Jackson, supra note 111, at 609-10 (footnotes omitted).
179. DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 187 (2004). Richard Fallon also notes
that there are "important commonalities," and a "similarity," though not identity, between U.S. strict
scrutiny and the proportionality tests used elsewhere. Richard H. Falon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1294-96, 1330-33 (2007). Speaking more generally about constitutions
around the modem world, David Law argues that "variations in text and terminology do not appear
to engender deep dissimilarities in the analytical structure of rights adjudication." David S. Law,
Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 694 (2005).
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separately and in order, as in Germany and Canada; while others-South
Africa and the ECHR, for example-employ a more gestalt version. Al-
though the concept of proportionality primarily concerns the means used to
limit a right, the tests employed also place restrictions on the ends that can
justify such limitation. Sometimes, as in the ECHR with its special limita-
tions clauses, these ends are specified in the text. Where they are not so
specified-as under the general limitations clauses in Canada and South
Africa, and sometimes in Germany-then only objectives of sufficient im-
portance in the circumstances are permissible. In Germany, this applies to
more important rights only; others, such as the general right to liberty, re-
quire only a legitimate objective. Turning to the proportionality test of
means itself, there are typically three prongs: (1) that the means are ration-
ally related to this objective; (2) that the means are necessary or minimally
impair the right; and (3) that overall, looking at the costs and benefits in-
volved, the means do not impose a disproportionate burden on the right
(proportionality stricto sensu)."s
Comparing the prongs of this test to those used in the United States, it is
clear that only the final one, proportionality in the strict sense, is generally
unfamiliar in the American rights context. Indeed, it is perhaps not entirely
coincidental that it is this final prong that gives rise to a second variation
among countries overtly employing proportionality tests, what Julian Rivers
refers to as "two conceptions of proportionality": a "common law" and a
"continental European" one.'' For the practice of several common law
countries reflects a certain unease with the third prong, sometimes by treat-
ing the necessity/minimal impairment prong as the final stage of
proportionality review, by formally omitting the proportionality stricto
sensu prong from statements of the test, by conflating it with the necessity• • 182
test, or by rarely relying on it in practice.
Regarding ends, in the absence of express limits, U.S. courts assess the
importance or legitimacy of the government interest put forward to justify
infringing or overriding the right in question, just as courts in Canada, South
Africa, and Germany do. As far as the three prongs of the proportionality
test for means are concerned, the rational relationship test is used for all
rights in the United States, although it is insufficient for those rights subject
to "heightened scrutiny." For such rights, a version of the minimal impair-
ment test is used in one formula or another (least restrictive means,
necessity, narrow tailoring, substantially related) under both strict and in-
termediate scrutiny. Especially in common law countries, these first two
prongs of the means test are far more common bases for invalidating state
180. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-40 (Can.) (for Canada); S. AFR. CONST. 1996
§ 36(1) (for South Africa); see generally NICHOLAS EMILIou, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
IN EUROPEAN LAW (1996) (surveying the proportionality tests in different European countries).
181. Rivers, supra note 120, at 177-82. According to him, these common law countries in-
clude Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Id.
182. See id. For example, in Canada, Peter Hogg has argued that the minimal impairment and
proportionality prongs are not conceptually distinct and should not be treated as such. Peter W.
Hogg, Section 1 Revisited, I NAT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 23 (1991).
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action than the final one."' But even here, although this third prong-
proportionality in the strict sense-forms no official part of any U.S. test for
constitutional rights, one can plausibly argue that it stands behind certain
common intuitions about a few controversial U.S. cases. For example, in
Korematsu v. United States,'8 one largely unstated reason for the near
unanimous current view that the internment of all persons of Japanese an-
cestry was unconstitutional is that the burden imposed was disproportionate
to the danger: that even if one grants a compelling interest and no less re-
strictive way of promoting it in the immediate circumstances, internment
was still a disproportionate means.
The bottom line of my analysis is that far from being exceptional, the
United States shares the deep common structure of modem constitutional
rights analysis. This structure employs a conception of rights as "shields"
rather than "trumps" against conflicting public policy objectives,'85 although
shields of varying (rather than uniform) sizes and strength. Rights claims are
adjudicated through a two-step analysis of asking first whether a right is
implicated and infringed, and second whether the infringement is justified.
This second step involves balancing the right against conflicting public pol-
icy objectives. Put another way, this structure means that legislatures are
granted a limited power to override constitutional rights, which is validly
exercised when the relevant burden of justification is satisfied. 86 Doing soinvolves tests of both ends and means-whether the objective is legitimate
183. See Rivers, supra note 120, at 177-82. Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell have argued that
section 1 analysis in Canada almost always turns on the minimal impairment prong. Peter W. Hogg
& Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures: (Or Perhaps The
Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing AfterAll), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 85 (1997).
184. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
185. I am employing the term used by Fred Shauer to describe the U.S. conception of consti-
tutional rights. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415,
429-30 (1993).
186. See Gardbaum, supra note 170 (identifying this common structure of constitutional
rights and presenting the missing normative justification for it; i.e., explaining why rights should be
overridable by conflicting public policy objectives of sufficient importance).
Within the United States and as part of the "antibalancing critique," there is a further sense in
which the structure of certain constitutional rights is sometimes claimed to be categorical. This is
the "excluded reasons" or "structural" conception of constitutional rights, which permits a right to
be limited or overridden not where it is outweighed by a conflicting public policy objective but
rather where the state has acted for a permissible (and not an excluded) reason. On this account, the
adjudication of certain rights becomes a categorical exercise that does not require or permit balanc-
ing: if the state limits a right for a non-excluded reason, its action is automatically constitutional; if
for an excluded reason, it is automatically unconstitutional. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balanc-
ing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 711 (1994);
Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitu-
tionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 735-36 (1998). Its adherents acknowledge, however, that this
conception applies only to certain specific rights in the United States, including the right to vote,
and does not provide a general account of U.S. constitutional rights practice. Moreover, "excluded
reasons" will rarely, if ever, amount to compelling or important governmental objectives under
conventional heightened scrutiny analysis in the United States. Finally, it has not been in this sense,
or for this reason, that comparative constitutional law scholars have made the general claim that the
United States has a more categorical conception of rights than elsewhere.
[Vol. 107:391
American Constitutional Exceptionalism
and sometimes sufficiently important in the circumstances, and whether the
challenged measure is a close enough means to that end.
Accordingly, even the two "hate speech" cases of R. v. Keegstra'11 and
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,'88 the outcomes of which are correctly taken to
epitomize significant substantive differences between the right of free
speech in Canada and the United States respectively, nonetheless share a
common structure of rights analysis.'8 9 Both courts found that their respec-
tive rights to free speech had been infringed by the two criminal laws under
the first step. Under the second step, both courts further found that the gov-
ernment's objective in regulating the respective speech was sufficiently
important to justify the restriction. What led to the different outcomes was
the final part, the means test. Specifically, whereas the Canadian Supreme
Court found that section 319(2) of the Criminal Code was rational and
minimally impaired the right,' 90 the U.S. Supreme Court found that singling
out the particular forms of hate speech covered by the law was not necessary
to achieve the city's compelling interest; an "ordinance not limited to the
favored topics" would have had the same effect. '91
My claim is not that there are no differences at all within this overarch-
ing common structure of rights analysis, but rather that such differences are
far less significant than often suggested, do not justify ascribing an excep-
tional conceptualization of rights to the United States, and do not detract
from the commonality of the basic and deep structure of rights analysis.
What remains are primarily micro-differences of form and label that are
largely a function of (1) greater age and parochialism and (2) the absence of
express limits on rights in the United States.
IV. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND HORIZONTAL EFFECT
A third fundamental structural issue is the scope of constitutional rights
and their reach into the sphere of private action. Within comparative constitu-
tional law, it is generally understood that the United States is exceptional on
this issue. The existence and operation of the distinctive U.S. "state action
doctrine" results in a greater public/private distinction in the scope of constitu-
tional rights and places the United States at, or closer to, the "vertical" end of
a spectrum of positions in contrast with the more "horizontal" approach of
187. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
188. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
189. In focusing on the common structure of analysis, I do not mean to deny some of the
differences in style and content identified by Jackson in her very perceptive discussion of the two
cases. See Jackson, supra note 11l, at 611-16.
190. On the other hand, the dissenters in Keegstra argued that the statute did not minimally
impair free expression.
191. R.A.Y, 505 U.S. at 396. It is undoubtedly true, as Justice White's concurring opinion
pointed out, that requiring a more inclusive speech restriction is an odd example of less restrictive
means analysis. Id. at 404.
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countries such as Germany, Ireland, Canada, and South Africa.'9' More in-
tuitively, perhaps, American constitutional lawyers tend to believe that the
state action doctrine protects private autonomy to a greater degree than
elsewhere.
This contrast is not exclusively or primarily the straightforward one that,
under the state action doctrine, constitutional rights only bind government
and not private actors (the traditional definition of the vertical position),
whereas elsewhere constitutional rights also bind private actors (the tradi-
tional definition of the horizontal position). Although there are a few
countries that adopt this latter position to some significant extent, 193 the
United States is still standardly deemed less horizontal than other coun-
tries-such as Germany and Canada-that formally share its basic position
that constitutional rights only bind the government. The reason is that such
other countries are said to occupy an intermediate position on the spectrum
in between vertical and horizontal effect that is referred to as "indirect hori-
zontal effect."'' 94 Under this intermediate position, although constitutional
rights do not directly regulate private actors, they do so indirectly by regulat-
ing the legal relationships of private actors among themselves. In this
indirect way, constitutional rights regulate what private actors can be legally
authorized to do with and to each other, what laws they can rely on in their
everyday activities or in court, and which of their interests, choices, and ac-
tions may be protected by law.'95
The more subtle claim of American exceptionalism, then, is that the U.S.
state action doctrine is distinctive in that it operates not simply to reject di-
rect horizontal effect but also in ways that reject or lessen the indirect
horizontal effect of constitutional rights. That is, it "functions as a far more
effective shield" against constitutional rights coming into play in the context
of private litigation than in other countries adopting the same formal posi-
tion that rights only bind the government. 9 6 Accordingly, the United States
192. See, e.g., Murray Hunt, The 'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act, 1998 PUB. L.
423, 427 ("The jurisdiction which is closest to the position favoured by the verticalists is the United
States.").
193. Examples include Ireland, South Africa, and Colombia.
194. On Canada, Hunt, for example, places the United States in the "vertical" position and
Canada in the more horizontal position of "indirect horizontal effect." See Hunt, supra note 192. On
Germany, see, for example, Edward J. Eberle:
The [German] Basic Law's influence on civil law is a notable contrast to American law....
[I]n comparison to the Basic Law's "objective" ordering of society, the American Constitution
withdraws from the important private sector of society.... In this way, the reach of the Ger-
man Basic Law is broader than its American counterpart.
EDWARD J. EBERLE, DIGNITY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS IN GERMANY AND THE
UNITED STATES 29 (2002).
195. See Stephen Gardbaum, The "'Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 387, 415 (2003).
196. See Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 11l, at 245 ("In the US the state action doc-
trine generally functions as a far more effective shield against substantive constitutional-rights




is generally understood to be more vertical and less horizontal in its ap-
proach than both Germany and Canada. 97
I believe this consensus is mistaken. Far from rejecting or limiting the
indirect horizontal effect of constitutional rights, the United States adheres
to this position in a form that is clearly stronger than Canada and as strong
as Germany. In other words, as a structural matter, constitutional rights have
no less a reach into the private sphere in the United States than in Germany
and a greater reach than in Canada. In order to explain why this is so, I will
discuss the position in each country, starting with Germany.
98
A. The Comparative Position of the United States
During the late 1950s, the German Constitutional Court resolved the
preexisting uncertainty concerning the Basic Law's position on vertical and
horizontal effect by developing the doctrine of mittelbare Drittwirkung-or
indirect third party effect of constitutional rights-which has remained
foundational ever since. '99 In essence, this doctrine holds that although con-
stitutional rights bind only government organs, they apply directly to all
private law (including the sacrosanct Civil Code) and therefore indirectly
affect private actors whose legal relationships are regulated by that law.
Constitutional rights, declared the FCC in the landmark Lath decision of
1958, form "an objective order of values."2 ° It continued:
This system of values, centring on the freedom of the human being to de-
velop in society, must apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the
whole legal system .... It naturally influences private law as well; no rule
of private law may conflict with it, and all such rules must be construed in
accordance with its spirit.20'
Accordingly, all private law is directly subject to constitutional rights
and is invalid if in conflict with them. What is indirect in the concept of in-
direct horizontal effect is the effect of constitutional rights on private actors.
Unlike the direct effect of constitutional rights on private actors resulting
197. See id. A few have questioned whether this claim is true of Canada. See Cheryl Saunders,
Constitutional Rights and the Common Law, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS, supra
note 11l, at 183, 183-84, 184 n.5 (arguing that Canadian courts have taken a "more cautious" ap-
proach than the U.S. Supreme Court in New York imes on equating the actions of courts and states
for purpose of triggering constitutional scrutiny); Rengta Uitz, Yet Another Revival of Horizontal
Effect of Constitutional Rights: Why? And Why Now?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELA-
TIONS, supra note 111, at 1, 8 (arguing that Canadian courts have refused to follow the logic of New
York imes).
198. In presenting this case, I build on and develop arguments made in Gardbaum, supra note
195, and Stephen Gardbaum, Where the (state) action is, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. (IoCON) 760 (2006)
(reviewing THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS, supra note 111).
199. See, e.g., Greg Taylor, The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights Provisions, the German
Model and Its Applicability to Common-Law Jurisdictions, 13 KING'S C. L.J. 187, 199 (2002) (argu-
ing that there is "no sign" of the indirect effect doctrine being abandoned by the FCC).
200. Liuth, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958), translated in KOMMERS, supra note 40, at 363.
201. Liith, 7 BVerfGE 198, translated in GERMAN LAW ARCHIVE (P. Schlechtriem et al. eds.,
Tony Weir trans., 1999), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/tgcmv580115.htm.
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from imposing constitutional duties on them in the fully horizontal position,
indirect horizontal effect is achieved via the impact of constitutional rights
on the private law that individuals invoke in civil disputes.
By contrast, Canada does not fully share this position. The reason is that
one important type of private law-namely, the common law-is usually not
directly subject to constitutional rights scrutiny. In the well-known leading
case of Dolphin Delivery,02 the Supreme Court of Canada took the "more
cautious ' '2°1 position of excluding the common law from full and direct con-
stitutional rights scrutiny in cases where no independent government action
204is involved. Instead, under their traditional and inherent power to bring the
common law into line with contemporary social values, Canadian courts
"ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution." 20s At
least formally, this difference in constitutional treatment of private law stat-
utes on the one hand and the common law at issue in private litigation on the
other-between Charter rights and Charter values-represents a less hori-
zontal position on the spectrum. I have elsewhere suggested that this general
position may usefully be termed "weak indirect horizontal effect," in con-
trast with the "strong" version in Germany.206 It is "weak" in the sense that
the impact of constitutional rights on (a certain type of) private law is not as
• • 207
great as where private law is fully and equally subject to the constitution.
How different are these two tiers of constitutional scrutiny in Canada:
the direct subjection of statutes to constitutional rights scrutiny and the more
indirect, or weaker, subjection of common law rules to constitutional values
analysis? Obviously, if in practice there is little or no difference, the formal
distinction between the two is insufficient to place Canada in a less horizon-
tal position. The most definitive test would presumably be to see how two
202. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573 (Can.).
203. See Saunders, supra note 197, at 183.
204. The primary reason was its interpretation of section 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which applies the Charter to the federal Parliament, the legislatures of each
province, and the "governments" of Canada and each province. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R.
at 598-99. The court interpreted "government" according to standard usage to mean the executive
branch only, with the consequence that the Charter applies neither to the courts nor to private actors.
See id.
205. Id. at 603.
206. See Gardbaum, supra note 195, at 415. 1 borrowed this term from Gavin Phillipson, who
used it to characterize what he argues is the best interpretation of the position on horizontal effect under
the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act. See Gavin Phillipson, The Human Rights Act, 'Horizontal
Effect'and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whisper?, 62 MOD. L. REv. 824, 833-43 (1999).
207. 1 have elsewhere proposed what I believe to be a more accurate and helpful spectrum of
positions on the reach of constitutional rights into the private sphere than the standard one: (1) a
vertical position, in which constitutional rights only govern public law and have no effect, either
direct or indirect, on private actors; (2) weak, indirect horizontal effect, in which constitutional
rights do not directly govern private law but have some lesser influence on it; (3) strong, indirect
horizontal effect, in which constitutional rights directly, fully, and equally govern all private law;
and (4) direct horizontal effect, in which constitutional rights directly govern private actors. See
Gardbaum, supra note 195, at 436-37.
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laws identical in content, but one in the form of a statute and the other a
common law rule, were evaluated under the two approaches. To the best of
my knowledge, there has been no such laboratory experiment. What we do
have are (1) subsequent general statements by the Canadian Supreme Court
that may shed light on whether there are any practical differences and
(2) extrapolations from nonidentical cases.
In Hill v. Church of Scientology,208 which after Dolphin Delivery is the
most important case on the topic, the Court was at pains to stress the impor-
tance of the distinction between the two tiers of scrutiny. It stated:
When determining how the Charter applies to the common law, it is im-
portant to distinguish between those cases in which the constitutionality of
government action is challenged, and those in which there is no govern-
ment action involved. It is important not to import into private litigation
the analysis which applies in cases involving government action•
2 9
And a little further on, the Court wrote, "it is very important to draw this
distinction between Charter rights and Charter values. Care must be taken
not to expand the application of the Charter beyond that established by
s.32(1), either by creating new causes of action, or by subjecting all court
orders to Charter scrutiny.' 2'0 These general statements seem to belie the
notion that the Canadian Supreme Court thinks the distinction of no practi-
cal significance.
Moreover, the Court in Hill proceeded to explain what that practical sig-
nificance consists of. First, as just noted, litigants must rely on existing
causes of action and courts may not create new ones.2 ' Second, courts must
take a cautious approach to amending the common law; "[fWar-reaching
changes ... must be left to the legislature."22 Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly:
[The party suing on the basis of a prevailing common law rule] should be
able to rely upon that law and should not be placed in the position of hav-
ing to defend it. It is up to the party challenging the common law to bear
the burden of proving not only that the common law is inconsistent with
Charter values but also that its provisions cannot be justified.2 3
By contrast, under a Charter rights claim the government bears the bur-
den of justification under section 1, the second part of the analysis.2 4
Two nonidentical cases that may shed some light on the comparison be-
tween Charter rights and values are Hill itself and R. v. Zundel.215 Both cases
208. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.).
209. Id. para. 93.
210. Id. para. 95 (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. Id. para. 96.
213. Id. para. 98.
214. Id. para 98.
215. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.).
December 2008]
Michigan Law Review
involved the issue of Charter protection of false and injurious statements,
the first under the common law and the second under a statute. In Zundel,
the Court invalidated section 181 of the Criminal Code as applied to prose-
cute the defendant for publishing a pamphlet entitled Did Six Million Really
Die?.16 Although three Justices dissented from the decision, all members of
the court agreed that the speech in question was protected under section 2(b)
of the Charter, despite its deliberate falsehood.2 7 This reflected what the
court described as the "broad, purposive interpretation" of section 2(b) un-
der which it "ha[d] repeatedly affirmed that all communications which
convey or attempt to convey meaning are protected ... unless the physical
form by which the communication is made (for example, by a violent act)
excludes protection. 2 8 Accordingly, writing for the majority, Justice
McLachlin concluded, "I cannot accede to the argument that those who de-
liberately publish falsehoods are for that reason alone precluded from
claiming the benefit of the constitutional guarantees of free speech., 2 ' 9 The
value of the speech was relevant only to the section 1 (proportionality)
analysis, in which the burden of proof is on the government and the Court
held section 181 failed because, unlike the more targeted provision of the
Criminal Code upheld in Keegstra, it did not pursue a sufficiently important
220
or pressing government purpose.
In Hill, decided after both Zundel and Keegstra, the Court upheld the
common law of defamation against a Charter value challenge after deter-
mining that it struck an appropriate balance between the twin values of
reputation and free speech. But in considering the weight of the free speech
value, the court stated:
Certainly, defamatory statements are very tenuously related to the core
values which underlie s.2(b). They are inimical to the search for truth.
False and injurious statements cannot enhance self-development. Nor can
it ever be said that they lead to healthy participation in the affairs of the
community. Indeed, they are detrimental to the advancement of these val-
ues and harmful to the interests of a free and democratic society."'
Here the Court seems to suggest that false and injurious statements may not
even be within Charter values protecting free speech at all, even though (as
we have just seen) they are within Charter rights. Moreover, there can be
little doubt after Zundel and Keegstra that a similar defamation law enacted
by statute-such as Ontario's Libel and Slander Act of 1990 (which was not
relied on by the plaintiff in Hill) or Quebec's civil code provisions on
216. Id. at 732-33.
217. Id. at 735. The Charter provision states: "Everyone has the following fundamental free-
doms ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and
other media of communication .... Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 36, § 2.
218. Zundel, [1992]2 S.C.R. at 752-53.
219. Id. at 758.
220. Id. at 758-59.
221. Hill v. Church of Scientology, [199512 S.C.R. 1130, para. 106 (Can.).
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222defamation -would conflict with the "broad, purposive" interpretation of
the right contained in section 2(b), thereby putting the onus on the govern-
ment to justify the statute under section 1. It is quite true that there were far
clearer public values at stake on the other side of the balance in Hill than in
Zundel, but the important point for present purposes is the quite different
treatment of the speech claim standing by itself in the two cases.
How does the United States compare? Does it in fact take a less horizon-
tal position than both Germany and Canada, as is generally thought? Simply
put, the United States takes the same position as Germany: constitutional
rights directly govern all private law and so indirectly govern private actors.
All law in the United States-including private law statutes and court-made
common law at issue in private litigation-is fully, equally, and directly sub-
ject to the Constitution.
This fundamental and quite general proposition does not derive from the
particularities of the Fourteenth Amendment's "no state shall" language or
the labyrinthine intricacies of the Supreme Court's state action doctrine. It
is, rather, a simple and straightforward mandate of the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI, which states, "This constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitutions or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 223 The
Supremacy Clause means that all law-state and federal, public and private,
statutory and common law-is governed by and subject to the Constitution
224
and its set of rights 4. The clause itself makes clear that the Constitution
binds state court judges, which strongly suggests it also binds the common
225law made by such judges and relied on in private litigation. This funda-
mental principle of U.S. constitutional law was simply applied or confirmed,
and not created, in the two landmark cases of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
226kins, which held that state common law is state law for constitutional
purposes, and New York Times v. Sullivan, which held that the state com-
mon law of libel at issue in private litigation is directly subject to the
Constitution.228
222. On the potentially differential treatment of defamation law in common law and civil code
jurisdictions within Canada, see Willmai Rivera-Perez, Dolphin Delivery: The Constitutional Values
Standard and its Implications for Private Law in Quebec (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
223. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
224. Gardbaum, supra note 195, at 418-19.
225. It was precisely the absence of such a provision expressly binding the courts to the Char-
ter in Canada, and the textual application to the legislative and executive branches only, that led the
Canadian Supreme Court to hold the common law not directly subject to constitutional rights in
Dolphin Delivery. See id. at 399-400, 419. By contrast, the inclusion of the courts among the "pub-
lic authorities" bound to act compatibly with the Convention rights is the central argument in the
United Kingdom for the indirect horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act. See id. at 408-09.
226. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
227. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
228. It should be noted that the Canadian Supreme Court explicitly rejected the U.S. position,
affirmed in New York Times and other cases, that the Constitution applies to common law rules at
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In explaining the influence of the Basic Law's value system on private
law, the FCC stated, as noted earlier, that: "no rule of private law may con-
flict with it, and all such rules must be construed in accordance with its
spirit.'' 29 Does this latter interpretive duty independently expand the scope
of constitutional rights into private law over and above the former "no con-
flicts" rule? In what follows, I will explain why the answer is no.
The interpretive duty means that, so far as possible, a private law rule
must be interpreted consistently with any relevant constitutional right; but if
• • 230
it cannot be so interpreted, then the private law rule is unconstitutional. In
the United States, it is somewhat uncertain whether such an interpretive duty
exits. If it does, then, of course, it will not be the basis for any significant
difference between the two systems. But the more likely situation is that no
equivalent interpretive duty is placed on the courts. First, although there is
the well-known "canon of constitutional avoidance," by which courts con-
strue statutes to avoid potential constitutional problems wherever possible, it
is unclear whether this creates an obligation rather than a discretionary
power. The U.S. Supreme Court sometimes refers to the canon as a "rule"
and sometimes as a "prudential policy. '23' Second, even if a rule binding on
lower courts, the canon is in a sense the opposite of the German duty for it
requires avoidance rather than engagement with constitutional values in the
interpretation of statutes.232 This places it among the "passive virtues" that
courts can employ to reduce the impact of the judicial review power2 33 and
explains why certain judicial proponents of judicial minimalism, such as
234Felix Frankfurter, favored its use.
Why doesn't the existence of such an interpretive duty independently
expand the reach of constitutional rights into private law? Let us consider an
often-cited German case that, at first glance, might appear to confirm this
issue in private litigation. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Deliv-
ery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 593-604 (Can.).
229. Lith, 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958); see supra note 197.
230. See Taylor, supra note 199, at 198-99.
231. Thus, in one leading case, Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council, the Court referred to the "rule of statutory construction ... where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress." 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (emphases added). But in another, NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, the Court referred to this canon as a "prudential policy." 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
232. Thus, in Catholic Bishop, the issue of statutory interpretation was whether the NLRA
applied to religious institutions. 440 U.S. 490. If it did, the Court found this would raise a serious
constitutional issue under the Free Exercise Clause; if not, no such issue would arise. Accordingly,
applying the canon, the Court held that the statute did not apply to religious institutions, thereby
avoiding engagement with the constitutional right. Id.
233. The concept and justification of the "passive virtues" as tempering the power of judicial
review is most often associated with Alexander Bickel, although he did not explicitly list the canon
of constitutional avoidance among the mechanisms available to courts in his most famous book.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 1962).
234. See Henry J. Friendly, Mr Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCH-
MARK 196, 210-12 (1967).
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independent impact of the interpretive duty. An employee was fired for re-
fusing to print material which, in his view, glorified war. The Federal Labor
Court held that, under Liith, the constitutional values of freedom of speech
and conscience must influence the private law of employment and its gen-
eral value of employer autonomy. Therefore, the governing unfair dismissal
statute's criterion of a "socially justified" cause of dismissal must, if possi-
ble, be interpreted in a way that takes such an act of conscience into
account.2" Accordingly, the court balanced the constitutional and private law
values at stake and found the dismissal unjustified. Having found that the
statute could be interpreted consistently with the influence of constitutional
values, it was unnecessary to refer the case to the FCC to consider the con-
236
stitutionality of the statute.
In the United States, a similar hypothetical scenario with an employee
suing under such an unfair dismissal statute would likely result in a decision
for the employer. But the reason would be neither that the statute is not sub-
ject to the First Amendment nor that there is no equivalent interpretive duty
on the courts. It would be because under current substantive interpretations
of the constitutional right to free speech and conscience, general laws with
incidental burdens on speech generally do not implicate the First Amend-
ment in any significant way, but carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality.17 The German case has a different result only because the
employment statute was deemed to implicate the constitutional values of
free speech and conscience and thereby triggered the latter's required influ-
ence. This is a purely substantive difference in the scope and interpretation
of the underlying constitutional right. If, like the FCC, the U.S. Supreme
Court were to adopt the incidental burdens rule for free speech (as it has, of
course, been urged to do in the free exercise of religion context), then a U.S.
court could do one of two things: (1) choose to interpret the statutory lan-
guage of "socially justified" cause of dismissal as excluding such conscience-
based actions, or (2) subject the statute to serious First Amendment scrutiny.
Exactly the same can be said regarding the non-hypothetical employment-at-
will laws that are more typical in the United States. Moreover, under existing
substantive interpretations in the United States, a law that explicitly permitted
an employer to fire an employee for expressing political views would almost
certainly be unconstitutional as a content-based regulation targeting speech.
235. Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labor Court), 47 BAGE 363 (1984) (ER.G.). The case is
discussed in Basil Markesinis, Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the
Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany, 115 L.Q. REV. 47, 58 (1999), and Peter E. Quint, Free
Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 274-75 (1989).
236. Bundesarbeitsgericht, 47 BAGE 363. The reference procedure is the basic mechanism for
getting cases to the centralized constitutional court under the European model. The case is discussed
in Basil Markesinis, Privacy Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights
Bill: Lessons from Germany, 115 L.Q. REv. 47, 58 (1999), and Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and
Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REv. 247.274-75 (1989).
237. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 114
(1987) ("The general presumption is that incidental restrictions [on speech] do not raise a question
of first amendment review."); see also Michael C. Dorf, hicidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1200-10 (1996).
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Accordingly, the practical difference between the presence and absence
of an interpretive duty is that, with the duty, a law is perhaps a little more
likely to be interpreted to include an exception for free speech than declared
unconstitutional. This does not appear to be much of a structural difference.
What is of far greater importance is (1) the substantive difference in the in-
terpretation and scope of the constitutional right to free speech between
being protected only from laws that target speech and those that impose in-
cidental burdens on it, and (2) the structural similarity that in both countries
all private law is subject to constitutional rights.
Finally on this point, perhaps the existence of the interpretive duty in
Germany (and the "objective order of values" philosophy behind it) is itself
responsible for the broader substantive scope of the free speech right to in-
clude incidental burdens-and presumably other constitutional rights as
well. The fact, however, that the FCC gives a narrower substantive interpre-
tation to certain other constitutional rights than a country without the
interpretive duty seems to refute this possibility. So, for example, like the
U.S. Supreme Court, the FCC has not adopted the "disparate impact test" as
part of its "suspect category" equality jurisprudence; it has found violations
only where there is facial discrimination on the basis of one of the express
grounds contained in Article 3(3). 21' By contrast, although there is no inter-
pretive duty placed on the courts, the Supreme Court of Canada has
interpreted Article 15, its equality provision, to presumptively prohibit laws
that either facially discriminate on one of the express grounds or, despite be-
ing facially neutral, do so in their effects-what in Canada is referred to as
"systemic discrimination.' 239 Accordingly, for countries such as Germany and
the United States, which adopt the structural position that all private laws are
fully and equally subject to constitutional rights scrutiny, the presence or ab-
sence of an interpretive duty has very little or no independent significance.
To be clear, my general argument in this Section is not a normative one
about what should be the case in the United States;u ° it is a description of the
existing constitutional position properly understood. Moreover, it is also obvi-
ously true that although all laws are subject to the Constitution, it is not only
laws that are so subject but also other forms of governmental conduct, such as
executive acts and the conduct of courts in adjudicating and enforcing the
238. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 3(3) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2000) ("No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parent-
age, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be
disfavored because of disability."); see JOHAN RABE, EQUALITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND JUSTICE
171-207 (2001).
239. See PETER W. HOGO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 1270-71 (4th ed. 1997) ("Sys-
temic discrimination is caused by a law that does not expressly employ any of the categories
prohibited by s. 15, if the law nevertheless has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons defined
by any of the prohibited categories. In other words, a law that is neutral (non-discriminatory) on its
face may operate in a discriminatory fashion; if it does, the discrimination is systemic .... The
mere fact that the law has the effect of discriminating against persons defined by a prohibited cate-
gory is enough to establish the breach of s.15.").




laws. In sum, the United States takes a more horizontal approach to the
scope of constitutional rights than Canada, because the common law at issue
in private litigation is directly, fully, and equally subject to the Constitution,
and shares the same general threshold position on the spectrum as Ger-
many-strong indirect horizontal effect-in which all private law must
conform to constitutional rights.
The problem, and much of the confusion, is caused by the fact that, as a
matter of existing substantive constitutional norms in the United States, the
vast majority of the common law is consistent with the Constitution. In this
sense, New York Times is an outlier, not because the common law of libel
was subjected to constitutional rights scrutiny-common law always is-but
because it failed that scrutiny. Given, for example, the existing substantive
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as presumptively prohibiting
only facial racial or gender discrimination or disparate impact resulting from
discriminatory intent, the common law of property, contract, and tort will
(unlike the common law of libel) almost always pass constitutional rights
scrutiny.14' Accordingly, the fact that it is always subject to such scrutiny
tends to drop out of the picture in favor of more promising constitutional
arguments. But were the Court to adopt a more extensive substantive equal-
ity norm, such as unconscious racism or (like the Canadian Court) disparate
impact alone, the existing structural position of strong indirect horizontal
effect-under which, once again, all private law (including the common
law) is fully and directly subject to the Constitution-would have a vastly
greater impact in practice on private actors.
B. The Surprising Role of the State Action Doctrine
Thus far, I have managed to describe the general U.S. constitutional po-
sition on the reach of constitutional rights into the private sphere without
relying at all on the notorious state action doctrine. But here is where it
comes in to supplement the picture. In most cases involving the common
law-again, New York Times is the outlier-in order to present a plausible
claim of a constitutional rights violation, given existing substantive norms, it
is necessary to come up with something more than simply subjecting the
underlying law to constitutional scrutiny. That something more may take at
least two forms.
The first is employment of the state action doctrine to create direct hori-
zontal effect on a private actor, so that the particular conduct complained of,
and not merely the background law relied on or authorizing it, is subject to
constitutional scrutiny. The public function and entanglement cases, such as
241. See Gardbaum, supra note 195, at 446-55. On the connection between the state
action/horizontal effect issue and various substantive norms, see, for example, Mark Tushnet, The
issue of state action/horizontal effect in comparative constitutional law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L.
(I-CON) 79 (2003); and Mark Tushnet, The Relationship between Judicial Review of Legislation
and the Interpretation of Non-Constitutional Law, with Reference to Third Party Effect, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS, supra note 111, at 167.
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Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, fall into this category. But note,
this use of the state action doctrine does not "shield ' '243 private litigation
from indirect horizontal effect-this effect always exists-rather, it pushes
private litigation into direct horizontal effect. It subjects the private ac-
tor/conduct itself to constitutional scrutiny. This is, of course, quite unusual
by comparative standards, so it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme
Court should permit this employment somewhat sparingly.
The second form of "something more" is to treat a court order enforcing
a law as a distinct, independent instance of state action, above and beyond
the underlying law that it is enforcing, whether common law or statute. This
again permits the more specific conduct involved-here of the state court-
rather than only the background law, to be subject to constitutional scrutiny.
In a sense, this route is the U.S. equivalent of the German constitutional
complaint directed at a private law court and was, of course, the one em-244
ployed in Shelley v. Kraemer because, as usual, the common law the court




Note that the state court injunction in Shelley was no less an enforcement of
the underlying common law rule involved in the case than the state court
damage award in New York Times. And yet no one in the latter case asked
whether a damage award was state action, the Court simply subjected the
common law that was being enforced to First Amendment scrutiny.
Now, I happen to think that the simpler and more coherent way of ana-
lyzing Shelley and some other common law cases is through the normal U.S.
constitutional doctrine of "as applied" (as distinct from facial) challenges.246
That is, although the common law on its face may pass constitutional muster
under existing substantive constitutional norms, it may fail these same
norms as applied to certain situations or persons. Thus, applying the race-
neutral common law of contracts or restrictive covenants to situations where
exclusion is based on race compels race-conscious action by the state inso-
far as one of the facts the plaintiff must prove to establish a breach of the
covenant is the race of the willing purchaser. Such unconstitutional applica-
tion would be quite different from independent, racially discriminatory
enforcement of the law by a court-for example, where it enforces restric-
tive covenants against some but not other racial groups.
In sum, if and to the extent that constitutional rights do have less impact
on private actors in the United States than in other countries rejecting direct
horizontality, it is neither due to an exceptional, more vertical structural
242. 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that racial discrimination practiced by a restaurant leasing
its premises from a state parking authority was state action).
243. See Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 11, at 245.
244. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
245. 1 am assuming here that the common law being enforced is ordinary contract law. If, as
some (including myself) have argued, the common law the court was enforcing was rather the law of
racially restrictive covenants as an exception to the normal common law principle of the free aliena-
bility of land, this would be a reason to find this common law itself unconstitutional as a form of
racial discrimination by the state.
246. For more details, see Gardbaum, supra note 195, at 449-50.
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position on the scope of rights nor to how the state action doctrine operates.
It is exclusively because of substantive differences in the rights themselves
and their interpretation; that is, not because fewer laws are subject to consti-
tutional rights scrutiny but because fewer laws may fail it.
For example, in the United States the constitutional right to free speech
has greater regulative impact on defamed private actors than it does in Ger-
many, Canada, and South Africa because substantively, greater weight is
given to this right in the balance with competing values, such as reputation,
dignity, and privacy.2 47 Thus, Sullivan, the losing plaintiff in New York 7imes,
was more affected and indirectly regulated by the First Amendment than a
similar plaintiff would be in these other countries. Private shop owners or
others subject to a political boycott will likely be significantly affected by
free speech rights in both the United States and Germany, in that, following
such cases as NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 24 and Liith,249 they will likely
be unable to obtain legal protection of their economic interests. In Canada,
the extent of the impact may depend on whether they are able to rely on the
(partially exempt) common law to protect their interests. In Germany, as we
have seen, the constitutional right to free speech has a greater impact on
private employers than in the United States because laws incidentally bur-
dening speech, and not only ones that target it, are deemed to implicate the
right.
On the other hand, the constitutional right to equal protection has a
greater impact on private actors in Canada than in either the United States or
Germany because the Canadian Supreme Court has adopted a disparate im-
pact interpretation of Section 15, the Charter's general equality provision.
Under this interpretation, more laws will infringe Section 15 and so cannot
be relied upon by private actors. In the United States, given the application
of the Constitution to all law relied on in private litigation, it is only because
of the Supreme Court's substantive interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause in Washington v. Davis211 that the clause does not have greater
regulatory impact on private actors by rendering more of the laws they may
seek to rely on unconstitutional. Were this interpretation to change, and that
of the Canadian Supreme Court adopted, there would be many more actions
that private actors could not be permitted to take, and many more interests
that could not be protected, under color of state law.
Mention of state law leads me to a brief final point. Although, as is well
known, there is currently only one textual exception to the general principle
of a state action requirement under the U.S. Constitution-the Thirteenth
247. See supra Section I.B (discussing defamation law).
248. 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that a state law awarding damages to shopowners for eco-
nomic loss caused by NAACP boycott of segregated shops violated the First Amendment).
249. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
250. See supra text accompanying note 239.
251. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that racially disproportionate impact alone, absent proof of
discriminatory intent, is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny).
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Amendment ban of slavery "anywhere in the United States"252-there are
several exceptions under state constitutional law. This fact is partly ex-
plained by the obvious irrelevance of the standard federalism rationale for
the principle, and it cautions against an overly uniform, federally biased
conception of constitutional rights and their scope in the United States.
Thus, at least seven state constitutions contain express rights against private,
as well as public, race and sex discrimination or rights to join labor unions
• 253
that apply to private employers. In addition, even absent such express ap-
plication to private actors, several state supreme courts have interpreted their
free speech, due process, and equality provisions not to have a state action
requirement.
V. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A final American structural exceptionalism is said to be that the U.S. Con-
stitution is exclusively a "charter of negative rather than positive liberties,
' 255
whereas constitutional rights elsewhere impose positive or affirmative duties
on government and do not only require its forbearance.
Analytically, this issue of negative and positive rights is distinct from
that of horizontal effect because it concerns the nature and content of the
duties that constitutional rights impose on whomever they bind. Usually, of
course, this is only government actors (even under indirect horizontal ef-
fect), but where they also bind private actors they may, at least in principle,
also impose positive duties on them. This analytical difference between the
252. See supra text accompanying note 32. During the Prohibition era, there was a second
exception under Section 1 of the Eighteenth Amendment: "After one year from the ratification of
this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed
by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
253. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4 ("Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation,
or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on
account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."). De-
spite this explicit application to private persons, the Montana Supreme Court showed initial
reluctance to depart from the federal Constitution, although it has been more willing to do so in
recent years. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Trans-
national Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 28-29 (2004). The constitutions of Alaska,
Louisiana, and New York contain similar provisions. The New Jersey constitution states, "Persons in
private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively." N.J. CONST. art. I,
§ 19. The constitutions of New York and South Dakota contain similar provisions. In addition, the
constitution of Alabama contains a provision very similar to the Thirteenth Amendment, making the
prohibitions of slavery and involuntary servitude applicable to private actors. ALA. CONST. art. I,
§32.
254. State supreme courts in California, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts,
and Oregon have applied their state constitutional free speech rights against certain private property
owners, notably owners of shopping malls. The New Jersey and Pennsylvania supreme courts have
also applied state constitutional equality provisions against private actors, and the New Jersey and
Alabama supreme courts have done the same with respect to state constitutional due process provi-
sions. The cases are discussed in John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a
Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J.
819 (1990).
255. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
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two issues also results in the very practical difference of who is a proper
defendant in a suit raising a constitutional rights claim: the government or a
private individual. Despite this analytical separation, however, in practice
positive rights are an important source of indirect horizontal effect. This is
because to the extent that constitutional rights require government to regu-
late private actors, private actors are indirectly affected by and subject to
them.256
In order to assess the existence or extent of American exceptionalism on
this structural issue, it is helpful to break down the general claim about the
exceptional absence of positive constitutional rights into its component
parts. These are: (1) the absence of social and economic rights in the U.S.
Constitution, as distinct from civil and political rights, and (2) the absence
of a constitutional right to protection; that is, constitutional rights do not
impose duties on the state to protect them against invasion by private actors.
These components identify the two main types of positive rights that some
modem constitutions contain.
This breaking down of the general claim may be helpful for three rea-
sons. First, it renders the task of evaluating U.S. exceptionalism on this
score easier and more accurate by refining the ways in which constitutions
may differ-for example, more on social and economic rights but less on
protective duties. Second, it serves as a reminder that not all positive rights
are social and economic in nature (some involve protective duties respecting
civil and political fights), and also that the converse is true: not all social and
economic rights are positive rights. Thus, such significant social and eco-
nomic fights as the right to strike, the fight to join a trade union, the right to
choose an occupation, and the right to educate one's child privately-where
recognized in a constitution-may (but need not) be exclusively negative in
scope, requiring only governmental forbearance from outlawing strikes and
unions, from prohibiting business entry, and from banning private schools.
Third, and connectedly, these two particular types of positive rights are con-
ceptually uncontested--or at least less contested-unlike the generaldichtom ofnegaiveandposiive" -257
dichotomy of negative and positive rights. At the very least, this ought to
256. See Gardbaum, supra note 198, at 767-69.
257. Although not the first to do so, Cass Sunstein has recently cast doubt on the general
distinction by arguing (1) that many seemingly negative constitutional rights-such as the right to
private property, freedom of contract, and criminal procedure rights---"require government assis-
tance, not governmental abstinence" and (2) that "[a]ll constitutional rights [and not only positive
ones] have budgetary implications; all constitutional rights cost money." Sunstein, supra note 8, at
94-95.
In making this first argument, Sunstein's implicit assumption about the scope of the constitu-
tional rights to private property and freedom of contract in the United States begs an important
question. If, post-Lochner and post-New Deal, there are such extensive constitutional rights as he
implies-including the right to have the state protect your property and contracts against private
infringements; i.e., the right to a system of private property-as distinct from the more limited (and
seemingly negative) rights against government takings of property without just compensation or
government deprivations of property without due process, and freedom of contract only against
arbitrary government regulation, it is incumbent on him to make this case. In other words, there are,
or may be, distinct negative and positive rights concerning property and contract. It is certainly
possible for property and contract rights to mandate governmental assistance as a matter of constitu-
tional law, but it is not inherent or necessary. Whether or not they do in the United States or
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result in an agreed subject matter of discussion and the avoidance of label-
ing disputes about whether a right is properly deemed positive or negative.
A. Social and Economic Rights
Turning to the first more specific claim, it is true, as Cass Sunstein
states, that "[t]he constitutions of most nations create social and economic
rights ... [b]ut the American Constitution does nothing of the kind." ' But
Sunstein then immediately goes on to ask: "What makes the American
Constitution so distinctive in this regard?"25 9 It is this latter claim about the
extent or degree of American exceptionalism that, I think, is interesting to
consider. Just how distinctive or exceptional is the United States with re-
spect to social and economic rights?
There are four ways in which the United States is less exceptional than
often thought in this area. First, while the "American Constitution" contains
no social and economic rights, the state constitutions of many states in the
United States do. It is well-understood that the Federal Constitution pro-
vides a "floor" or minimum of constitutional rights below which states
cannot go, but states are free to grant their citizens greater constitutional
rights-as long as in doing so they do not violate the minimum nationally
260guaranteed rights of others. Many states have taken advantage of this free-
dom to create state constitutional social and economic rights in the absence
of federal ones. Moreover, this phenomenon is at least partly due to the rela-
tively distinctive features of American federalism, in which the general
subject matter of most social and economic rights-housing, poverty, and
education-is still substantially governed by state rather than federal law. In
this way, the United States "has not just a system of dual constitutionalism
but dual constitutional traditions, '26' a fact that challenges overly uniform
(particularly laissez-faire) conceptions of its constitutional culture. Thus,
while there is no federal constitutional right to education, "every state con-
stitution mandates the establishment of free public schools and requires the
state to educate children who live within its borders. 26 2 Similarly, "[u]nlike
the Federal Constitution, every state constitution in the United States ad-
dresses social and economic concerns, and provides the basis for a variety of
elsewhere, the basic conceptual distinction between negative and positive rights appears to survive
this challenge.
258. Id. at 92.
259. Id.
260. The rallying cry for states to begin to take advantage of this freedom was William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1977). Perhaps the best-known example, decided during the currency of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), was Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), which held that crimi-
nalizing homosexual sex violates the state constitutional right of privacy.
261. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONsTITUTIONs 6(1998).
262. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Ration-
ality Review, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1999).
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positive claims against the government. 263 For example, the New York Con-
stitution has a Welfare Clause that explicitly requires the legislature to
provide for "the aid, care and support of the needy,"66 and seventeen other
state constitutions have similar provisions.26s
Second, while "most" other countries grant social and economic rights
in their constitutions, not all do. From the perspective of assessing how ex-
ceptional the United States is on this issue, another important country
without any social and economic rights in its constitution is its neighbor,
Canada. Like the U.S. Constitution, the text of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which came into effect as the supreme law of the land
266in 1982, contains no express social and economic rights. Moreover, like
the U.S. Supreme Court since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court of Canada
has moved away from implying social and economic rights into certain of
the express civil and political rights, despite earlier indications that it might
do so. Thus, notwithstanding arguments that the right to security of the per-
son under section 7 of the Charter should be interpreted to include
261
constitutional rights to basic welfare services, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has not done so and looks increasingly unlikely to.
26 s
In the leading section 7 case of Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General),
decided in 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected what it described as
this "novel" interpretation of the right to security of the person, although it did
not entirely rule out the possibility that, in some future case, special circum-
stances might lead the Court to endorse it.269 More recently, however, in 2004,
the Court seemed to make this less likely when it stated that under section 7,
"the legislature is under no obligation to create a particular benefit. It is free
263. Id. at 1135.
264. N.Y CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
265. These are: Alabama, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyo-
ming. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims:
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1076 (1993);
Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
881,893-95 (1989).
266. Martha Jackman, The Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter, 20 OTTAWA L.
REV. 257, 338 (1988) ("The Charter was written, with little public consultation, by governments
that had abandoned their commitment to the welfare state. It is thus hardly surprising that the Char-
ter contains no explicit reference to social and economic rights; that, in fact, these rights were never
even discussed." (footnotes omitted)).
267. See id. at 337.
268. Robert J. Sharpe, The Impact of a Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciary: A Canadian
Perspective, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS 431, 441 (Philip Alston ed.,
1999) ("At the other end of the spectrum are social welfare rights, very much a part of the Canadian
political fabric, but not explicitly protected in the Charter. It has been argued that the right to a basic
level of material wellbeing is implicit in the Section 7 guarantee of 'life, liberty and security of the
person'. The Supreme Court has deliberately avoided answering the question but it seems unlikely
that the Court will give an affirmative answer. While the Court will not be able to avoid social
welfare issues entirely ... it seems unlikely that the Court would interpret the present language of
the Charter to include social welfare entitlements." (footnotes omitted)).
269. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 434, 2002 SCC 84 (Can.).
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to target the social programs it wishes to fund as a matter of public policy,
provided the benefit itself is not conferred in a discriminatory manner.
' 270
Accordingly, rather than simply American exceptionalism, the phenomenon
here is perhaps more accurately described as North American exceptional-
ism. And given the extensive Canadian welfare state that was in place as "a
matter of public policy" well before the existence of the Charter, this raises
the question of the relevance or importance of such constitutional excep-
tionalism.
In actual fact, the exceptionalism is not limited to North America. More
generally, few other common law countries contain social and economic
rights in their bills of rights or constitutions. The Australian Constitution
does not include a bill of rights at all; the only individual right of any sort is
the freedom of expression implied by High Court from the constitutional
requirement of democratic elections."' New Zealand and the United King-
dom do not have written constitutions, but both have fairly recently enacted
statutory (or super-statutory) bills of rights that contain only civil and politi-
cal rights and no social or economic rights. The Irish Constitution of 1937
grants no social and economic rights but rather, as is well known, contains a
set of "directive principles of social policy" that are "intended for the gen-
eral guidance of [Parliament] ... and shall not be cognisable by any
Court.273 The Indian Constitution of a decade later exactly copied the Irish
model in this regard,174 although the Indian Supreme Court has implied a
270. Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [20041 3 S.C.R. 657, 2004 SCC 78, para.
46 (Can.). A second Charter provision from which it has been argued welfare rights can and should
be implied is the general equality clause of section 15. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
supra note 36, § 15. But although the Canadian Supreme Court has, under the label of "substantive
equality," adopted a somewhat more rigorous antidiscrimination test than the U.S. Supreme Court in
that it looks into discriminatory impact (on disadvantaged groups) as well as intent, this still results
in the conditional rather than absolute duty or mandate inherent in any antidiscrimination norm. See
generally Judy Fudge, Substantive Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Limits to Redis-
tribution, 23 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 235 (2007).
271. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106
(Austl.).
272. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990
S.N.Z. No. 109. On the "super-statutory" nature of the two, see generally Gardbaum, supra note 6.
Philip Joseph has described the absence of social and economic rights in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights:
Attempts were made within the Government caucus to embellish the [New Zealand Bill of
Rights] Act with economic and social rights as guaranteed by some international instruments,
notably the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Advocated were the rights to work and an
adequate standard of living, and the rights to housing, education and State health care....
However, the Government rejected this recommendation since it was felt that such 'rights'
were, by nature, non-justiciable. Social or State welfare benefits fell to political rather than ju-
dicial process, and would have made the legislation 'unmanageable.'
Philip A. Joseph, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Experience, in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS, supra note 268, at 283, 289.
273. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 45.
274. INDIAN CONST. art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable in
any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the
country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these [directive] principles in making laws.").
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275positive right to housing from the seemingly negative textual right to life.
Among common law countries, the post-apartheid South African Constitu-
tion of 1996 is one of the few to include social and economic rights in its
text.276
Moreover, even among continental western European countries, the ex-
tent to which constitutions contain social and economic rights can easily be
exaggerated. The Austrian Constitution contains none. The constitutional
texts of several other countries contain only one or very few such rights.
Thus, the only express positive social or economic right in the German
Basic Law is that "[e]very mother [is] entitled to the protection and care of
the community. ' 277 The German Constitutional Court has, in addition, im-
plied a positive right to public education from the provisions of Article
7(1) 278 and to a minimum level of subsistence exempt from income tax from
various constitutional provisions, including the state's duty to protect human
dignity contained in Article 1.27' The only social or economic right in the
Norwegian Constitution is the aspirationally phrased provision declaring
that "[i]t is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create condi-





The Swedish Constitution does not contain any social or economic rights in
its list of enumerated "fundamental rights and freedoms" contained in chap-
ter 2, but, in one of its preamble-like opening provisions expressing the
general aims of public power, states that "it shall be incumbent upon the
public institutions to secure the right to health, employment, housing and
education, and to promote social care and social security.""'' Finally, the
European Convention on Human Rights, which the ECtHR has referred to
275. Ahmedabad Mun. Corp. v. Nawab Khan (1996) Supp. 7 S.C.R. 548 (India).
276. These include the right to have the environment protected, art. 24; the right to have ac-
cess to adequate housing, art. 26; the right of access to health care, sufficient food and water, and
social security, art. 27; and the right to education, art. 29. See discussion of the right to housing,
infra notes 305-309 and accompanying text.
277. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 6(4) (F.R.G.), translated in The Basic Law of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (2000). In addition, Articles 7(4) and 12(1) contain two more negatively phrased
ones: "The right to establish private schools [is] guaranteed," and "[aill Germans shall have the right
freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of training." Id.
arts. 7(4), 12(1). Finally, Article 20 proclaims that "[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a ...
social federal state," id. art. 20(1), a provision the FCC has declared as non-justiciable and not giv-
ing rise to an individual right, although it has used it to help interpret statutes and other
constitutional provisions.
278. See CURRIE, supra note 69, at 285 n.90 (citing School Prayer Case, 52 BVerfGE 223,
236 (1979) (F.R.G.)).
279. See Heike Krieger, Comment, The Protective Function of the State in the United States
and Europe: A Right to State Protection?, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
11l, at 153, 155 (citing 82 BVerfGE 60 (1990) (F.R.G.)).
280. KONGERIGET NORGES GRUNDLOV [Constitution] art. 110 (Nor.), translated in The Con-
stitution of the Kingdom of Norway (2007), available at http://www.stortinget.no/english/
constitution.html. In addition, Article 110(b) contains the "third generation" right that "[e]very
person has a right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose
productivity and diversity are maintained." Id. art. I 10b.
281. REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [Constitution] 1:2 (Swed.), translated in The Constitution,
available at http:/www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_Page 6307.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2008).
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as "a constitutional instrument of European public order ' 2 2 and which the
forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe are bound to observe,
includes no express social or economic rights-positive or negative-apart
from the negative rights to property and education contained in a separate
subsequent protocol.2 3 Moreover, in very marked contrast to its practice
284
with respect to protective duties, the ECtHR has repeatedly refused to im-
ply social and economic rights from the civil and political ones listed in the
text.
285
Accordingly, while the United States is indeed in the minority among all
contemporary nations in not having any social and economic constitutional
rights, its position is certainly not unique-and, especially when compared
to its "peer" group of developed countries, not really that distinctive. For it
is the constitutions of the newly liberated countries of central and eastern
Europe and South Africa, as well as other developing nations, that more
consistently include significant numbers of social and economic rights,
which partly explains why it is from South Africa (and also from India on
the implied right to housing) that the leading cases on adjudicating such
286
rights have come.
Third, in several countries with substantial numbers of social and eco-
nomic constitutional rights, the practical impact of these rights is
significantly reduced either by express textual statements in the constitution
that some or all such rights are not judicially enforceable or by judicial prac-
tice to that effect. Thus, apart from the right to education, the Spanish
Constitution, like the Irish and Indian constitutions previously mentioned,
declares a set of "guiding principles of economic and social policy" that is
217
expressly excluded from being enforced by the courts. Similarly, apart
282. Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, at 27 (1995).
283. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Protocol I arts. 1-2, March 20, 1952, CETS No.: 009. The right to education provision
appears to expressly rule out affirmative duties on the state. Id. art. 2 ("In the exercise of anyfunc-
tions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the fight of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philoso-
phical convictions." (emphasis added)).
284. See infra text accompanying notes 314-316.
285. See Krieger, supra note 279, at 154; see also Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001 -I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 41, para. 99 ("Whether the State provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a
matter for political not judicial decision."); Beard v. United Kingdom. App. No. 24882/94, 33 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 442, para. 110 (2001).
286. See, e.g., Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Afr.); Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Aft.); Ahmedabad Mun. Corp.
v. Nawab Khan (1996) Supp. 7 S.C.R. 548 (India).
287. CONSTITucI6N [C.E.] Ch. M (Spain), translated in SPANISH CONSTITUTION (1992). The
Principles Governing Economic and Social Policy are contained in a separate chapter of the Spanish
Constitution, Chapter III, which follows Chapter I1: "Rights and Freedoms." Section 53(1) declares
that "[t]he fights and freedoms recognized in the Chapter 2... are binding on all public authorities"
and that any citizen may make a claim based on them before the regular courts. Id. § 53(1) (empha-
sis added). By contrast, Article 53 (3) states: "Recognition, respect, and protection of the principles
recognized in Chapter 3 shall guide positive legislation, judicial practice and the actions by public
authorities." Id. § 53(3) (emphasis added).
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from full rights to primary education18 and the right to aid in distress,' 89 the
Swiss Constitution contains a set of "social goals" that is expressly declared
to be non-justiciable. 290 The Netherlands Constitution declares that "[lit shall
be the concern of the authorities" to promote or secure certain social and
economic goals, such as "sufficient employment, ' 29' "the health of the
population," 292 and "sufficient living accommodation"; 293 but it specifically
grants "rights" only to "a free choice of work" and to "aid from the authori-
294
ties" for those unable to provide for themselves. In addition, as previously
mentioned, Article 120 expressly denies Dutch courts the power of judicial
review at all,29- which obviously prevents these two rights from being en-
forced against the legislature.
Finally on this point, the situation in France takes a little longer to de-
scribe. The preamble to the previous constitution of 1946 contained a
number of social and economic "principles" in addition to reaffirming the
"rights and liberties" of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
296the Citizen. Under this constitution, however, no institution was granted
the power to review legislation for constitutionality. The current, 1958 Con-
stitution of the Fifth Republic, which created the Conseil constitutionnel
with limited powers of judicial review,297 contains few individual rights and
no social or economic ones but does refer to the preamble of the 1946 con-
2951
stitution in its own preamble. In 1970, the Conseil departed from the
288. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV], CONSTITUTION [Cst] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 27
(Switz.), translated in FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION (2002), available at
http://www.admin.ch/org/polit/OOO83/index.html?lang=en.
289. Id. art. 12.
290. Id. art. 41, $ 4 ("No direct subjective right to prestations by the state may be derived from
the social goals.").
291. GRONDWET [Gw.] [Constitution] art. 19(1) (Neth.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (2002).
292. Id. art. 22(l).
293. id. art. 22(2).
294. Id. arts. 19(3), 20(3).
295. Id. art. 120 ("The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be re-
viewed by the courts.").
296. LA CONSTITUTION, 1946 CONST. Preamble U 2, 11 (Fr.), translated in JOHN BELL,
FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263-64 (1992) ("In addition, [the French people] proclaim[] the
following political, economic, and social principles as particularly necessary for our times .... It
guarantees to all, especially to the child, the mother, and aged workers, the protection of health,
material security, rest, and leisure. Any human being who, by reason of his age, physical or mental
health, or economic situation, is unable to work, has the right to obtain appropriate means of subsis-
tence from the community.").
297. LA CONSTITUTION, 1958 CONsT. arts. 56-63 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CONSTI-
TUTION (1958).
298. "The French people solemnly proclaims its attachment to the rights of man and to the
principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and comple-




previous understanding and declared this preamble legally binding.299 None-
theless, of the social and economic principles in paragraph 11 of the
preamble to the 1946 constitution, m° the Conseil has treated only the protec-
tion of health as being of constitutional value. As a result, the Conseil has
held that individuals have a right to choose their own doctor and that health
is a public interest justification capable of restricting the right to property,
but not that this right imposes positive obligations on the state.3 °1
Even where judicially enforceable, constitutional courts have generally
been cautious about the scope of their review of social and economic rights
and have tended to grant legislatures wide discretion as to the means of ful-
302filling their positive duties. Accordingly, a reasonableness test has been
the norm. In South Africa, this reasonableness standard-relative to avail-
able resources-is actually contained in the text as defining the positive
obligations of the state with respect to most social and economic rights,
303
and the Constitutional Court has as a result rejected the proposition that
such rights entitle individuals to be provided with a "minimum core. '3°4 As
is well known, however, in the important cases of Grootboom°t and Treat-
ment Action Campaign,° the Constitutional Court held that government
policies in the areas of housing for the desperately needy and combating
mother-to-child transmission of HIV were unreasonable and thus unconsti-
tutional. Both the Japanese and South Korean supreme courts have subjected
textual rights to minimum living standards to highly deferential reasonable-
ness tests under which government programs were upheld, although both
acknowledged that government failure to act at all to promote the constitu-
tional objective would amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion.3 7
299. CC decision no. 70-39DC, June 19, 1970, Rec. 15.
300. See supra note 296.
301. See BELL, supra note 296, at 148-49.
302. Mark Tushnet has linked the issues of the form of judicial review and the possibilities of
constitutional social welfare rights by arguing that weak-form judicial review may be particularly
appropriate for such rights and so, given the characteristic legislative final word, result in their great-
er protection. See Tushnet sources cited supra note 105.
303. For example, section 26 of the South African Constitution states: "(1) Everyone has the
right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right." S. AFR.
CONST. 1996, § 26.
304. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Aft.) at para.
34.
305. Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Aft.).
306. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
307. Article 25(1) of the Japanese Constitution provides that "[aill the people shall enjoy the
right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living." KENP6 [constitution]
art. 25, para. I (Japan), translated in The Constitution of Japan (1968). The South Korean Constitu-
tion guarantees people "to have a life worthy of human beings." S. KOREA CONsT. art. 34, translated
in The Constitution of the Republic of Korea, available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/
english/welcome/republic.jsp. The two cases announcing the deferential reasonableness tests were
Asahi v. Japan, 21 MinshOi 5, 1043 (Sup. Ct., May 24, 1967), translated in THE CONSTITTIrrONAL
CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 130, 135 (Hiroshi Itoh &
Lawrence Ward Beer eds., 1978), and Livelihood Prtection Standard Case, 9-1 KCCR 543, 94
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The Italian Constitutional Court has also generally interpreted the many
social and economic rights contained in the country's 1947 constitution as
imposing a reasonableness test on governmental policy in the relevant ar-
308
eas.
The final and perhaps most important point is that the existence and ex-
tent of modem welfare states do not appear to be correlated in any
significant way to the presence, absence, or scope of constitutional social
and economic rights, or to whether they are justiciable. Thus, Canada, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, and the Netherlands all have extensive and stable welfare states
despite either nonexistent or limited constitutional mandates. Moreover,
these countries do not have lesser welfare states than western European
countries with more extensive constitutional mandates, such as Italy or
Finland. By contrast, several countries elsewhere have less generous, stable,
or successful welfare states despite greater constitutional requirements.
Accordingly, as in the United States, welfare states are overwhelmingly the
products of ordinary legislative processes rather than of constitutional courts
stepping in to apply and enforce constitutional guarantees."O
B. Constitutional Rights to Protection
Let's turn to the second type of positive right often found in modem
Western constitutions but deemed absent from the American: a constitu-
tional right to protection from the state against violation or undermining of
certain civil and political rights by private actors. Unlike social and eco-
nomic rights, which, where granted, are typically express, such protective
duties are more evenly divided between text and judicial implication. So, for
example, the constitutions of South Africa, Greece, Switzerland, and Ireland
contain express rights to state protection."' Elsewhere, protective duties
have been implied by the judiciary from certain textual fights that otherwise
seem negative. For example, the best-known and most important protective
duties (Schutzpflichten) in Germany concern the right to life and freedom of
expression. As we have seen, the FCC famously interpreted the former in
HunMa 33, May 29, 1997 (S. Korea), summarized in THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, THE
FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1988-1998, at 239-42 (2001).
308. E.g., Italian Constitutional Court, Case 252/1988, cited in Francisco Rubio Llorente,
Constitutionalism in the "Integrated" States of Europe n.21 (NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet
Center, Working Paper No. 5/98, 1998), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/98/
985004.html ("[O]nly the legislature, weighing up the available resources and the interests capable
of being satisfied over time, can rationally adapt the means and the consequences of such [socio-
economic] rights.").
309. Examples include the constitutions of Egypt, Serbia, and Turkey.
310. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
519, 526-32 (1992); Wiktor Osiatynski, Social and Economic Rights in a New Constitution for
Poland, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 233, 241-49 (Andrds Saj6 ed., 1996).
311. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 12(1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom and security
of the person, which includes the right ... (c) to be free from all forms of violence from either pub-
lic or private sources.").
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the First Abortion Case to require the state to protect the lives of fetuses
against such Fprivate actors as their mothers, presumptively through the
criminal law." The right to freedom of broadcasting was also interpreted by
the FCC to require state regulation to ensure that citizens have access to the
full range of political opinions necessary for informed decision making at
elections.3 3
The ECtHR has also been active in inferring protective duties from the
seemingly negatively phrased civil and political rights contained in the
European Convention. In a series of cases, it has ruled that both the right not
to be subjected to "inhuman or degrading treatment" under Article 3 and the
"right to respect for ... private and family life" under Article 8 require
states to enact laws effectively protecting children from sexual and other
physical abuse by private adults.3 4 It has also held that freedom of assembly
requires positive action, including effective police protection, to ensure the
right may be exercised;' and Article 8 also requires effective action against
industrial pollution.
16
Even here, however, I will argue that the United States is less excep-
tional than often thought, for two reasons. First, as with social and economic
rights, if the U.S. Constitution lacks such protective duties, it is not the only
constitution to do so. Thus, once again, Canada seems closer here to the
United States than to South Africa, Germany, and the ECHR. Although to
the best of my knowledge, the Canadian Supreme Court has not decided any
cases equivalent to DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services,3 " both the dominant general underlying philosophy of the Charter
(including its limited application to the common law and the absence of so-
cial and economic rights discussed above) and at least one lower court
decision suggest there may be no constitutional right to protection against
private violence.38 Second, even with respect to countries with protective
312. See Second Abortion Case, 88 BVerfGE 203 (1993) (ER.G.). The positive protective
duty was in part justified by the FCC on the basis of the express duty in Article 1 (1) that to "respect
and protect [human dignity] is the duty of all state authority." Id. As Gerald Neuman discusses,
following the First Abortion case in 1975 establishing the state's duty to protect life and bodily
integrity, the FCC responded to claims of a duty to protect life and health in a variety of other con-
texts by recognizing the claim in the abstract but never finding that the legislature had failed its duty.
Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United
States and Germany, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 273, 297 (1995).
313. Television I Case, 12 BVerfGE 205 (1961) (F.R.G.).
314. X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1985); see also Stubbings v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22083/93 & 22095/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 213 (1996); Krieger, supra
note 279, at 156 n. 16 (collecting cases).
315. Plattform "Artze fur das Leben," 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
316. Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998); Lopez Ostra v. Spain,
App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994).
317. 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see also infra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
318. In Doe v. Board Of Commissioners [1990], 74 O.R.2d 225, 236 (Can.), the Ontario Divi-
sional Court stated that the Charter placed no obligation on the state to ensure that life, liberty, or
property did not come to harm through means other than state action. It also stated, however, for the
purpose of upholding a lower court's dismissal of the defendant's motion to strike, that failure by the
police to perform a positive statutory duty for improper reasons may violate sections 7 and 15 of the
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duties, the differences between them and the United States, while real, are
less significant than they appear at first glance. This is because there is
greater convergence at both ends than is often supposed: the United States is
less negative and countries with implied protective rights are less positive.
Let me begin with the United States.
The starting point here is the seemingly axiomatic status of the general
principle that the U.S. Constitution is a "charter of negative rather than posi-
tive liberties,, 31 9 which was applied in two well-known cases denying a
constitutional duty to protect the life of citizens from threats emanating
from non-state actors. The first, in which this "slogan"'3 20 was also an-
nounced, was the lower court case of Jackson v. City of Joliet, holding that a
police officer was under no constitutional duty to help car accident victims
who died while the officer was directing traffic away from the crash. 32' The
second case was DeShaney, in which a bare majority held that Wisconsin
had no constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause to protect a child
from life-threatening violence at the hands of his father, even though the
child had been under the state's care.322
I believe the general principle is open to serious question. First, I find
persuasive Steven Heyman's argument that the DeShaney majority's claim
that neither the text nor the history of the Fourteenth Amendment supports a
constitutional right to protection is wrong on originalist grounds.3 Second,
the general principle is not in fact well established in the Court's jurispru-
dence. Notwithstanding the outcomes of these two cases, the principle itself
was and is dicta; cases really requiring a holding that states have no consti-
tutional duty of protection at all have not been decided, and may well be
decided differently.
In a well-researched and elegantly written article, Heyman argues that
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the long-established Lockean and
common law "first duty of government" to protect the life, liberty, and prop-
erty of its citizens from each other was quintessentially and exclusively a
task of state government, which is why such a positive right to protection
Charter. Id., cited in Helene Combrinck, Positive State Duties to Protect Women from Violence:
Recent South African Developments, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 666, 686-87 (1998).
319. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
320. This is how John Goldberg has characterized the phrase. See John C.P. Goldberg, The
Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs,
115 YALE L.J. 524, 592 (2005).
321. Jackson, 715 F2d 1200. Two previous abortion-funding cases had also suggested this
general principle (and were cited in Jackson), although they raised the arguably distinct issue of a
right to governmental funding. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) ("It cannot be that
because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives ... government, therefore, has an
affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain
contraceptives ... "); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) ("The indigency that may make it
difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither
created nor in any way affected by the [state] regulation [prohibiting state funding for abortions].").
322. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
323. Steven J. Heyman, The First Dut' of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
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appears in several of the earliest state constitutions but not in the federal
one.32' Following the Civil War, however, state governments in the South
proved they could no longer be trusted to fulfill this "first duty" absent na-
tional oversight, given their manifest and intentional failure to protect new
black citizens. Accordingly, the right to protection by the state was purpose-
fully incorporated into the federal Constitution by the Fourteenth
Amendment, primarily as one of the traditional "privileges and immunities"
of citizenship newly guaranteed against the states but also by implication in
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. In response to Chief Justice
Rehnquist's argument to the contrary in DeShaney, Heyman convincingly
shows why the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could not plausibly
have intended to leave the duty of protection purely to state "democratic
political processes. 3 5
Independent of the proper originalist understanding of the Due Process
Clause, however, the general principle that the U.S. Constitution is exclu-
sively a charter of negative rights against government is not well established
in the Court's jurisprudence and so has not in fact achieved the axiomatic
status that is sometimes claimed for it. Whether or not murder and theft
laws, for example, are truly discretionary as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law remains an open question because, being nonexistent, the
permissibility of such gaps in the law has not been tested.12 Apart from the
well-known exceptions to the general principle where government is respon-
sible for an individual's predicament, such as the duty to provide adequate
medical care, food, and clothing to those it has imprisoned or involuntarily
324. Id. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 declared that "[e]very member of society hath
a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII.
Similar provisions soon appeared in the constitutions of Delaware, Massachusetts ("Each individual
of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, ac-
cording to standing laws." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X), and New Hampshire ("Every
member of the community has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and
property." N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 12). Heyman, supra note 323, at 512. The Massachusetts and
New Hampshire provisions are still part of their respective state constitutions, thus creating state
constitutional rights to protection against private violence.
325. Heyman, supra note 323; see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
326. Accordingly, my point here is different than Frank Michelman's argument that in prac-
tice there may not be much difference in actual protection between the United States and other
countries, even though in the United States such duties are statutory rather than constitutional. See
Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and Europe: the Con-
stitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 111, at 131, 149-51.
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committed,"' there is, I believe, a case to be made for the existence of more
"absolute" duties in addition to such "conditional" ones.32 s
In DeShaney, Jackson, and the more recent case of Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzalez,329 the fact that the social service officials and police officers-
and thereby the state-may not have had a constitutional duty to protect
individual citizens in the particular circumstances of the cases does not
mean that more general legal protection against private violence is also dis-
cretionary. Even if an individual state official does not have a duty to help X
enforce his contract against Y, it does not follow that the state is constitu-
tionally free not to provide a general system for the legal enforcement of
contracts. 330 Nor does the fact that an individual police officer is not under a
constitutional duty to help a property owner eject a trespasser from her land
mean that having a legal system of property protection is discretionary. In
other words, there is a distinction between a protective right to legislation or
common law rules on the one hand and rights to action by individual
government officials on the other.31 Whether a general system of private
property and contracts is constitutionally required in the United States, as
distinct from specific prohibitions on governmental taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation and arbitrary regulation, is, I believe, a
difficult and open question; it is at least not obviously the case that they are
not.332
In rejecting the constitutional due process claim in DeShaney, the major-
ity opinion noted that "Randy DeShaney was subsequently tried and
327. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982) (holding that the state is obli-
gated to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with adequate food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (holding that the state is required to
provide adequate medical care to incarcerated prisoners). But see David A. Strauss, Due Process,
Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 53, 63-68 (arguing that the Court's
exception for custodial arrangements is not really an exception at all because the principle underly-
ing the exception implies that the government has affirmative duties to every person in society).
328. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. Rav.
864, 881-82 (1986) (distinguishing between absolute positive duties and conditional ones triggered
by voluntary state conduct).
329. 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that plaintiff did not have a property interest in police
enforcement of the restraining order against her husband for procedural due process purposes).
330. This point is consistent with my critique of Sunstein's argument against the distinction
between negative and positive rights, see supra note 257, because my critique was of the conceptual
point that negative rights always require governmental assistance; i.e., that a purely negative consti-
tutional right cannot and does not exist. I insisted above that different negative and positive rights to
property are entirely possible and conceivable-and that Sunstein had assumed rather than argued
for the proposition that the United States has a positive right to property. Id. So my argument here
that the United States may in fact have positive rights to property or contract, rather than the per-
fectly coherent negative right, does not undermine the general distinction between the two.
331. I am grateful to Dick Fallon for encouraging me to make this distinction explicit. John
Goldberg has explicated the general idea of a constitutional right to law (or a body of laws) in mak-
ing a powerful case that there is a constitutional right to a general protective law of torts to redress
private wrongs. Goldberg, supra note 320. He also distinguishes this positive right from the right to
benefits and argues that the fight to law should form a third branch of due process, "structural due
process." Id.
332. David Strauss has also argued for a constitutional right to a minimum level of protection
against private wrongs in the areas of torts and property. See supra note 327.
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convicted of child abuse. 333 Similarly, in Castle Rock, had the father who
murdered his three daughters not been killed in a shoot-out at the police
station, he would presumably have been convicted of homicide. The Court's
affirmation in this second case that, under DeShaney, the police had no con-
stitutional duty to enforce the restraining order that might have prevented
the murders does not answer the separate question of whether the exis-
tence of the homicide law is left to state political processes. The criminal
law is, of course, a form of state protection of one individual from another,
so in neither case was the majority faced with a situation of no legal re-
dress-a situation in which the fathers' actions were lawful. In other words,
the existence of state criminal law may satisfy the protective constitutional
duty imposed on states. After all, in the German First Abortion Case, the
content that the FCC gave to the state's protective duty was a presumptive
requirement that the life of the fetus be protected by the criminal law, that
abortion be generally criminalized;... and in DeShaney, Joshua's life was so
protected by the state. Moreover, although in a slightly different context, the
majority opinion in Castle Rock expressly rejected the notion that such pro-
tection is "'valueless'-even if the prospect of those sanctions ultimately
failed to prevent [the father] from committing three murders and a sui-
cide. 336 Accordingly, and notwithstanding the more general dicta in all three
cases, I take the larger question of the general constitutional requirement of
protection as far from settled by them. The issue-and the difference be-
tween the United States and certain other countries-may well be not
whether there are absolute duties to protect but rather their scope.
The second feature of U.S. jurisprudence that narrows the constitutional
gap is the effect of the Equal Protection Clause. As David Currie has persua-
sively argued, this clause operates to create "conditional affirmative" duties
in both protection against third parties and the provision of government ser-
vices: "[I]f government undertakes to help A, it may have to help B as
well. 33 7 Moreover, given the practical impossibility of abandoning either
murder or theft laws (even if, contrary to what I have suggested, they are not
obligatory) or government services such as welfare programs, the practical
effect of the Equal Protection Clause will often be the same as if there were
an absolute affirmative duty.
38
The force, however, of Currie's point about the gap-filling character of
the Equal Protection Clause is, I think, both weaker and stronger than he
states. It is weaker in the area of government services because only certain
333. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989). Strauss
notes this point in arguing that the actual holding in DeShaney was significantly narrower than the
general charter of negative liberties principle because the state did not deny Joshua all protection
against private violence. See Strauss, supra note 327, at 56.
334. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 755, 768.
335. See 39 BVerfGE I (1975) (F.R.G.).
336. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760.
337. Currie, supra note 328, at 881.
338. Id. at 882.
[Vol. 107:391
American Constitutional Exceptionalism
bases for exclusion and differential treatment-namely race, ethnicity, na-
tional origin, gender, state citizenship status, and sometimes alien status-
provide the level of judicial scrutiny likely to result in the conditional duty.
Other bases-including age, health, or wealth-trigger the deferential ra-
tional basis test, which permits significant under- and over-inclusiveness as
to who is deemed similarly situated. Accordingly, in the area of social and
economic benefits, choosing to help A may not require the government to
help B as well.339
But Currie's point is stronger in certain important areas relevant to pro-
tective duties, including abortion. Currie correctly points out the fact that in
the First Abortion Case the FCC found the fetus to be a person protected by
the right to life was not the only or conclusive difference from Roe. A sec-
ond, and even more distinctive one, was the positive duty to protect the
fetus's right to life against such private actors as the mother and doctor-a
duty normally requiring criminalization of abortion. 340 But even though a
U.S. court would not ostensibly find such a positive duty-were the fetus
deemed a person under the Fourteenth Amendment-the impact of the
Equal Protection Clause might effectively create one. This is because it
would arguably violate equal protection-in the most literal sense-for cer-
tain persons, namely fetuses, not to have their lives protected equally by a
state's criminal laws.34' If discrimination with respect to such a fundamental
right as the right to life were held to trigger strict scrutiny, it is hard to see
how any conflicting interest, except the life and health of the mother, could
be compelling enough to satisfy it. 42 This would be true even if such crimi-
nal laws were not themselves constitutionally mandated, although, as I have
argued above, they may well be. Accordingly, equal protection might well
effectively create a positive duty to protect the life of a fetus if it were
deemed a person, so that the actual U.S. and German positions would not be
far apart.
In sum, in the United States, there may well be certain affirmative con-
stitutional duties to protect rights against invasion by third parties and to
provide government services-both absolute and conditional. Although the
scope of any such absolute duties may be less than in some other countries,
the practical effect of the conditional duties will often be the same. If this,
then, is how and why constitutional rights in the United States are less
339. Of course, even if the Equal Protection Clause is found to be violated by the discrimina-
tion, absent social and economic rights the government is always constitutionally free to end the
discrimination by ending the benefit to all; although this option was stipulated not to be open for
political reasons. Id. ("[I]n the modem world it is almost as unthinkable for a state to abandon wel-
fare payments as to stop punishing crime.").
340. Id. at 869-70; see also First Abortion Case, 39 BVerfGE 1, 42-44 (1975) (F.R.G.).
341. As the majority opinion in DeShaney stated, "The State may not, of course, selectively
deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989).
342. The alternative analysis would be that state abortion laws are social and economic legis-
lation subject only to a rational basis test, which they would presumably satisfy.
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negative than is often thought, let's turn to the other side of the ledger and
see how and why they are less positive in certain other countries.
First, although protective duties are typically inferred from negatively
phrased rights, this inference is still made from only a limited number of
rights. That is, courts inferring positive rights do not apply a general princi-
ple that all rights are inherently positive but rather read positive duties into
certain particular rights. 4 ' The result is that a majority of negatively phrased
rights still carry only negative duties of forbearance even in those regimes,
such as Germany and the ECHR, that largely created the phenomenon.344
Second, as with social and economic rights, the level of judicial scrutiny
to which the positive, protective dimension of constitutional rights are sub-
ject is typically lower-more deferential-than that afforded to the negative
dimension. Accordingly, protective rights generally grant to governments
greater discretion in doing what they must do than negative ones grant in
what they cannot, and in this sense have less practical effect. As we have
seen above, constitutional rights are typically protected by a proportionality
test under which the intensity of scrutiny varies, among other things, with
the importance of the right in question. Even the relatively less important
rights, however, are subject to the minimal impairment prong that provides
additional protection above and beyond the rationality prong. It is in this
sense that proportionality protects rights more than the U.S. rational basis
test, which effectively applies only the latter. Protective rights, however, are
generally subject to only a form of reasonableness test, rather than the usual
proportionality test.3 45 That is, courts typically ask only whether the state has
reasonably fulfilled its positive duty, a lenient and deferential test that rarely
results in findings of failure. The reasons for this more lenient test are the
standard reasons for wariness about including positive rights in constitu-
tions: that in telling the elected branches of government what they must do,
the judiciary lacks institutional expertise and assumes control of the public
purse. In Germany, the FCC has not held that the government violated its
protective duty with respect to the right to life and health in any case other
346than the two concerning abortion.
Finally, although this point directly goes to explanation rather than de-
scription of the difference, it also suggests that future developments may
further erode the difference itself. As Currie points out, most of the positive
rights in Germany-and one might add elsewhere too--"involve areas in
which there has been an effective government monopoly.'3 47 These include
343. See supra text accompanying notes 312-313.
344. I acknowledge the arguments made for the proposition that all fundamental rights in
Germany may have protective duties, but it has not been affirmed by the FCC. See, e.g., Dieter
Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note Ill, at 119, 125.
345. See Currie, supra note 328, at 888.
346. See Neuman, supra note 312, at 295-300.
347. Currie, supra note 328, at 888.
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"broadcasting, higher education, and the use of force." 348 Even the abortion
issue operates within the framework of a comprehensive public health ser-
vice unknown in the United States. In this context, it becomes virtually
impossible to exercise a constitutional right without government assistance,
so mere forbearance is insufficient. Where broadcasting stations, universi-
ties, and hospitals are all public, simply limiting the power of government to
regulate these entities does not ensure a space in which individuals can ex-
ercise their rights, as it more arguably does when they are private. As Currie
concludes, looked at in this way, the German cases are essentially equivalent
to the U.S. position "that a state must provide medical care to those it has
imprisoned." 39 Accordingly, to the extent that privatization and the erosion
of public services continue in western Europe and elsewhere, there may be a
350corresponding retraction in the sphere of positive duties.
CONCLUSION: WHAT'S AT STAKE?
Why does a proper understanding of the myth and the reality of Ameri-
can constitutional exceptionalism matter? Even if my partial debunking of
the myth is correct, what turns on it? Although I firmly believe that descrip-
tive accuracy and correcting widely held misconceptions before they
become too entrenched within the relatively new discipline of comparative
constitutional law are of intrinsic scholarly importance, I also think there are
several significant consequences that follow from getting the extent of
American constitutional exceptionalism right. Roughly speaking, these im-
plications can be divided into the more practical (or first order) and the more
theoretical/methodological (or second order).
First, debunking the myth may enhance the perceived utility of compara-
tive constitutional law and thereby promote further growth of the discipline.
By breaking down the mutual wall of separation and practical irrelevance
created by a false sense of "otherness," it will perhaps encourage greater
comparative constitutional study both of the U.S. system by non-Americans
and of foreign systems by Americans. No longer will the other system gen-
erally be viewed as so different in its foundational principles and
assumptions about rights that nothing tangible is to be learned or gained
from deeper engagement with it.
Second, as a particular manifestation of this first point, to those for
whom the case against reference to foreign constitutional law and decisions
by U.S. courts is premised on American constitutional exceptionalism,35'
then the thesis of this Article weakens that case. The similarities in the struc-
ture of constitutional rights mean that there may well be relevant things to
learn from foreign sources.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. There might also, of course, be an increase in the horizontal effect of constitutional
rights. See supra Part IV.
351. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 5.
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But, third, the similarities in structure suggest that what there is to be
learned is not limited to the structure of rights but may also extend to sub-
stance. Let me begin to explain by making explicit a judgment that has
perhaps remained only implicit thus far: the structural similarities that I
have analyzed are, in at least two ways, more important than the substan-
tive differences in an overall assessment of whether, and to what extent,
.- •352
the U.S. rights tradition is exceptional. The first is that, in virtually every
case, what is exceptional about the substance of rights is the product of
relatively recent changes in their interpretation and was not always so. For
this reason, it is difficult to think of substantive exceptionalism as an en-
during or inherent part of the U.S. rights tradition. Thus, as is well known,
the strong protection given to free speech was a work-in-progress on the
part of the Supreme Court that began during the mid-1920s and was not
completed until the mid-1960s.353 In this regard, it is worth noting that the
Lfth case in Germany was decided six years before New York Times v. Sul-
livan. No law, state or federal, was struck down under the Establishment
Clause until 1948. 354 Prior to Smith in 1993, U.S. religious freedom juris-
prudence was not exceptional. From approximately 1890 until 1936, the
Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to choose one's occupa-
tion.5  As recently as 1976, the death penalty was unconstitutional. For
much of the twentieth century, evidence of the original understanding of
constitutional provisions tended to be deemed "inconclusive" and was
largely ignored. Until the 1940s, the Supreme Court relied on foreign consti-
tutional practices to determine if federal criminal procedural protections
contained in the Bill of Rights were so "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" as to apply against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3 7
By contrast, the principles governing the structure of constitutional
rights in the United States are significantly older and have not tended to
change much over time. Thus, as a matter of precedent, the source of the
state action doctrine is still considered to be the Civil Rights Cases of
352. I also think the structural similarities are more important to focus on because the sub-
stantive similarities are well known. Finally, I do not intend to be making any general judgment
about the greater importance of "similarity" than "difference" in comparative law, but a far more
limited one about the greater importance of the structure than the substance of rights in the specific
context of gaining a proper sense of whether and to what extent the U.S. "rights tradition" is excep-
tional.
353. That is, roughly from Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), to New York Tines Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
354. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) (invalidating
sectarian classes held in public schools by parochial school teachers).
355. During the Lochner era, the Court invalidated several laws restricting entry into busi-
nesses and occupations. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (striking
down state law requiring certification for manufacturers of ice); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590
(1917) (invalidating law prohibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from workers).
356. The constitutional permissibility of the death penalty was reinstated in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
357. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (rejecting the claim that double
jeopardy violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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1883," 8 although the basic principle underlying it (that constitutional rights
bind only government actors) was undoubtedly thought to apply to the Bill
of Rights from the outset. Judge Posner may have coined the quotable
phrase that the U.S. Constitution is "a charter of negative rather than posi-
tive liberties,"35 9 but he certainly did not claim to be inventing the principle,
which both he and the Supreme Court in DeShaney expressly attributed to
the Framers.3' 6 And, as I have argued above, the rejection of a categorical
conception of constitutional rights in favor of understanding rights as
"shields," as presumptive claims but which are in principle overridable by
conflicting public policy objectives, goes back at least as far as 1905. Even
if, as I have argued, misconceptions and inaccuracies surround the distinct-
iveness of these principles, their enduring quality qualifies them as the heart
of the U.S. constitutional rights tradition and justifies the effort to gain a
proper understanding.
This first way in which the structural similarities are more important
than the substantive differences also points towards the second. The struc-
tural principles that I have discussed in this Article tend to function as
axioms of constitutional rights jurisprudence within every system. That is,
they are relatively fixed, overarching tenets that resolve threshold issues
applicable to all substantive rights and help to shape, influence, and set the
general parameters of their content. In this sense, the structure of rights is
more fundamental or foundational than their substance. And if this structure
were truly exceptional in the United States, one would expect it to result in
substantive differences. Accordingly, to change our understandings-or per-
haps assumptions--of how distinctive these unchanging axioms of U.S.
constitutional law actually are, to see that far from being exceptional they
are in the mainstream of contemporary constitutionalism, is to remove the
foundation stone thought to underlie many of the differences in substantive
outcomes and make it easier to change the interpretations of certain rights
once again.
In this regard, the Article suggests that there are no great, distinctive
structural barriers to a more "social state" approach to constitutional rights
jurisprudence in the United States. Specifically, the United States does not
stand apart from the modem conception of constitutional rights as important
claims that may nonetheless be limited or overridden by certain conflicting
public policy objectives. Bringing the two-stage process of adjudication out
from the constitutional shadows makes it more likely that there will be
greater focus on, and self-conscious attention to, the second stage. The state
action doctrine notwithstanding, the U.S. Constitution already fully governs
the legal relations of private individuals as it does in many other countries;
there is no distinctive, threshold constitutional immunity or presumption
protecting "private autonomy." The actual extent to which constitutional
358. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
359. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
360. See supra notes 324-327 and accompanying text.
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rights restrict (or promote) such autonomy is purely a matter of their sub-
stantive scope and interpretation.
Neither is there a fundamental gulf between the United States and other
countries on the issue of social and economic rights. The United States does
not stand alone in currently rejecting them; several other countries without
constitutional social and economic rights nonetheless have very extensive
welfare states, so that their absence cannot be said to imply "constitutional
hostility" to such policies; and even in countries with some social and eco-
nomic rights, the extent of their actual welfare states goes well beyond what
is constitutionally mandated. Judicial implication of a few social and eco-
nomic rights from seemingly civil and political ones is fairly common in
other countries and, especially given the general penchant of the U.S. Su-
preme Court for implying both rights and their limits, no great structural
leap would be necessary for it to follow suit. Similarly, in the area of consti-
tutional rights to protection, the overly general and absolutist "charter of
negative liberties" slogan should no longer preempt, and serve as a distrac-
tion from, careful consideration of more particular and specific
constitutional duties.
Finally, moving to the second-order level, I would like to back into a
brief discussion of the Article's general methodological and theoretical im-
plications in the following way. As previewed in the Introduction,36' in Ran
Hirschl's terminology, the methodological approach of this Article is pri-
marily "concept formation through multiple description. 3 62 I would, of
course, like to think that the Article does not merely fit this category of
comparative constitutional scholarship but also in some small way helps to
justify it. In any event, it is not focused on explanation but on understanding,
and self-evidently not on providing empirically testable causal hypotheses.
But to the extent it is possible, or permissible, to say anything at all about
explanation without deploying data sets and regression analyses, what might
explain the structural similarities and substantive differences that I have de-
scribed and analyzed at length?
The structural similarities are, I believe, best explained as a form of
practical near-necessity within the dominant sub-category of liberal-
democratic constitutionalist culture that embraces constitutionalized
rights.363 That is, at the deeper, or threshold, level at which the structural
principles operate, there are powerful factors that pull in the direction of
convergence given the overall constraints of liberal-democratic constitution-
alism. So, once rights have been constitutionalized, the claims of conflicting
361. See supra text accompanying note 26.
362. Hirschl, supra note 26, at 43.
363. That is, within the overall category of liberal-democratic constititutionalism, there are
two traditional sub-categories, commonly referred to as constitutional and legislative supremacy.
Even during the heyday of this dichotomy, there were countries-such as Australia-that straddled
the two by embracing constitutional supremacy but without a bill of rights. More recently, the legis-
lative supremacy model has been in steep decline; several countries previously adhering to it have
developed the new, third sub-category discussed in Part 11 ("the new Commonwealth model"),
which aims to combine the two.
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public policy objectives create strong pressures of various sorts to affirm a
general conception of rights as shields rather than trumps with a two-stage
process of adjudication. Once a constitution is granted the status of supreme
law of the land-of providing law for the lawmaker-there is a certain force
to the claim that it should govern all law, private as well as public, but not
otherwise directly regulate individual citizens. And once a bill of rights is
being framed or subsequently interpreted, there are pragmatic reasons for
focusing on more traditional civil and political rights and leaving the exis-
tence or extent of positive social and economic rights to legislative decision.
After all, unlike standard tyranny-of-the-majority reasons for endorsing the
former-including negative property rights-those who benefit from posi-
tive social and economic entitlements typically form the electoral majority
so that there is no obvious, prima facie reason to distrust the democratic
process in this area. Although perhaps the same can be said for rights to ba-
sic protection (which, to the extent they are lacking in some countries, may
be why), as a primary practical reason for constituting governments in the
first place, one might still expect them to be included. Although this expla-
nation employs a "universalist" approach to arrive at core principles, it is far
more a form of empirical or practical universalism than a normative one.
Nothing in this very brief account suggests that constitutions either could
not or should not adopt variant structural principles of rights.
By contrast, I think substantive differences in constitutional rights within
the general parameters set by these structural principles are best explained
by a combination of contextual factors, including differences in political and
legal culture, expressive values, and the age and content of constitutional
texts. These factors of divergence tend to play out here rather than at the
level of structure.
In terms of what the Article might contribute to general discussions
about scholarship in comparative constitutional law, I want to conclude with
a plea for pluralism and a warning against being hemmed in by false or un-
necessary dichotomies. Methodologically, the Article suggests that there is
no natural monopoly here to fight over but rather plenty of intellectual space
for different approaches to make their own distinctive contributions to the
field. Although, of course, both its goals and criteria for valuable scholarship
are legitimate bones of contention, comparative constitutional law-more
clearly than comparative law in general-is a subject and not a method
(unlike, say, law and economics). It may well be that different methodologi-
cal approaches are particularly appropriate for different areas or tasks: a
form of division of intellectual labor. So, as just mentioned, contextualism
and expressivism may be particularly helpful approaches to the study of
substantive differences in constitutional rights and constitutional texts more
generally, whereas analytical and conceptual methods may be more illumi-
nating for understanding their underlying structures. Similarly, as the work
of many scholars illustrates, the issues of constitution-making and judicial
power/conduct are ones for which both empirical, causal methodologies and
public choice theory have been especially fruitful. Functionalism may be
particularly appropriate for separation of powers and federalism issues, and
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normative constitutional and political theory for specifying the contours of
liberal-democratic constitutionalism and its alternatives, and the choice
among its various forms.
The Article also suggests that squeezing first-order scholarship in com-
parative constitutional law into the molds provided by certain influential
second-order dichotomies and paradigms may not always be the best way to
proceed. Thus, the refining of ideas about American constitutional excep-
tionalism that comes from distinguishing between the structure and
substance of rights shows that there is not an either/or choice between con-
vergence and divergence, or between similarity and difference.36 In reality,
both are almost always present in any area of comparative study, and pre-
commitment to one or the other sometimes obstructs rather than promotes
valuable first-order scholarship. Whether, and in what sense, the similarities
are more important than the differences, or vice versa, should be the result
and not the premise of the analysis. Additionally, as comparative legal scho-
lars continue to debate whether the metaphors of "transplant," "borrowing,"
or "migration" of ideas from one system to another best captures what is
365taken to be the major process of legal change, the Article serves as a re-
minder that both similarities between systems and internal changes are also
the products of what might be thought of as parallel development in the law.
Thus, in the United States, the structure of constitutional rights that I have
argued it shares with most other Western constitutional systems developed
largely in splendid isolation, which at least partly explains why the labels
attached to the various principles mostly differ. Similarly, the relatively re-
cent changes in the interpretation of many constitutional rights in the United
States that have created most of the substantive differences were almost ex-
clusively internally generated.
Every country is claimed to be special, and so they are to their citizens
and many non-citizens as well.366 But special is not the same as exceptional.
364. For several helpful essays on the sameness/difference dichotomy in comparative law
theory, see COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 25.
365. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(2d ed. 1974); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 5.
366. As a European living and working in this country, the United States is certainly special to
me, as is the United Kingdom, of which I am a citizen.
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